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MISSING THE MISJOINDER MARK: 
IMPROVING CRIMINAL JOINDER OF 
OFFENSES IN CAPITAL-SENTENCING 
JURISDICTIONS 
MILTON J. HERNANDEZ, IV* 
In all state and federal jurisdictions in the United States, joinder allows 
prosecutors to join multiple offenses against a criminal defendant. Joinder 
pervades the American criminal justice system, and some jurisdictions see 
joinder in more than half of their cases. Most states and the federal courts 
use a liberal joinder system where courts may join offenses regardless of 
their severity or punishment. These systems derive from judicial efficiency 
arguments, seeking to avoid unnecessary trials and striving to conserve time, 
money, and other resources. In a liberal joinder regime, the court may force 
a defendant to prepare for a trial in which she must simultaneously defend 
against a misdemeanor offense, like possession of marijuana, and a capital 
felony offense with a potential death sentence—even though the two charges 
may require completely different defense strategies. 
Jurisdictions should no longer broadly protect the joinder of all types 
of offenses in the name of judicial efficiency or juridical discretion. Instead, 
jurisdictions should categorically protect defendants charged with capital 
offenses from the potentially prejudicial nature of joinder, as Louisiana has 
for nearly a century. Born from the state’s unique judicial history, 
Louisiana’s joinder regime restricts joinder to those offenses which are 
triable by the same “mode of trial,” a phrase that has undergone statutory 
interpretation, constitutional examination, and judicial scrutiny. Louisiana 
offers its criminal defendants a structural, procedural protection by 
 
 * J.D./D.C.L., Louisiana State University Paul M. Hebert Law Center, 2019. Attorney, 
U.S. Department of Justice. The views expressed in this Article are the author’s own and do 
not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Justice or the United States. The 
author would like to extend the sincerest thanks to Melissa T. Lonegrass, Eulis Simien, Jr., 
Carmen Guidry, Justin DiCharia, Bradley Guin, Haley Grieshaber, the SEALS 2020 Annual 
Conference Public Law Works-in-Progress Panel participants, and the Journal of Criminal 
Law & Criminology. This piece would not have been possible without their guidance and 
suggestions. Any errors are the author’s own. 
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prohibiting the joinder of capital offenses with noncapital offenses. Although 
other scholars have published articles and studies criticizing joinder 
regimes, pointing out the ways in which offenses’ joinder may prejudice 
defendants, or presenting data to show prejudice’s existence in practice, 
none have yet suggested—as this Article does—that jurisdictions revise their 
joinder regimes to prohibit the joinder of capital and noncapital offenses. If 
jurisdictions revised their joinder schemes in this way, they could maintain 
liberal joinder regimes for the most common criminal cases, where joinder 
is most efficient, without continuing to hinder those defendants who face the 
most serious consequences and the highest stakes during their trials. 
This Article first discusses the history and current status of joinder in 
most jurisdictions, followed by the history and current status of joinder in 
Louisiana. It then explains capital-offense joinder in Louisiana and how it 
differs from other jurisdictions in the United States. The Article further 
analyzes the arguments for liberal joinder and critiques them by presenting 
research in the field, practical considerations, and historical arguments. The 
Article concludes by urging other jurisdictions, particularly those with 
capital sentencing capabilities or capital offense punishments, to amend their 
joinder provisions to prevent the joinder of capital offenses with noncapital 
offenses. If jurisdictions revised their joinder schemes in this way, they could 
maintain liberal joinder regimes for the most common criminal cases, where 
joinder is most efficient, without continuing to hinder those defendants who 
face the most serious consequences and the highest stakes during their trials. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2005, Alabama charged a criminal defendant with the murder of a 
two-year-old, a capital offense under Alabama law.1 Before trial, the 
prosecution joined the murder charge with a charge alleging possession of a 
controlled substance, which carried a lesser penalty of up to ten years’ 
imprisonment.2 A jury ultimately convicted the defendant of both charges3 
and recommended that the defendant receive the death penalty for the murder 
 
 1 Boyle v. State, 154 So. 3d 171 (Ala. Crim. App. 2013). See also ALA. CODE § 13A-5-
40(a)(15) (2020). Because the victim was under fourteen years old, Alabama law classified 
the murder as capital. Id. 
 2 See Boyle, 154 So. 3d at 183. 
 3 See id. at 186. 
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charge.4 The trial court upheld the jury’s death penalty recommendation and 
conviction for the possession charge.5 On appeal, the defendant argued that 
the joinder of the two offenses was improper, and that the two offenses 
should have been severed and tried in different proceedings.6 After analyzing 
the relevant federal and state law, the Alabama Criminal Court of Appeals 
upheld the joinder because the offenses arose out of the same course of 
criminal conduct.7 Joinder of the two offenses, the court found, did not 
prejudice the defendant,8 despite the stark differences in the offenses’ 
sentences. 
In 2016, the Supreme Court of California decided a criminal case in 
which a jury convicted the defendant on four separate counts related to events 
that occurred over a two-month period: one count of first-degree murder; two 
counts of assault by a life prisoner with malice aforethought; and one count 
of custodial possession of a weapon.9 At the penalty trial, the jury sentenced 
the defendant to death.10 The defendant argued that the trial court “abused its 
discretion in denying his motion to sever” the murder count and one of the 
assault counts from the other two counts, contending that this violated his 
right to a reliable capital proceeding, among other rights-based violations.11 
In addition, the defendant contended that without the severance, he 
could not take the stand at his trial.12 He argued that he had a potential defense 
to the first-degree murder charge—one that was inapplicable to the others—
but because the charges were joined in one trial, he was forced to refrain from 
taking the stand so as not to incriminate himself on the less severe counts.13 
Following a lengthy discussion, the court rejected all of the defendant’s 
severance and rights-violation arguments and upheld the joinder.14 In 
deconstructing all of the prejudicial joinder arguments, the court said: 
“Contrary to defendant’s arguments, we do not apply a heightened standard 
in assessing severance issues in capital cases.”15 The court affirmed the death 
sentence.16 
 
 4 See id. at 185. 
 5 See id. at 185–86. 
 6 See id. at 187. 
 7 See id. at 188–89. 
 8 See id. at 190. 
 9 People v. Landry, 385 P.3d 327, 339–41 (Cal. 2016). 
 10 See id. at 339. 
 11 Id. at 348. 
 12 Id. at 351. 
 13 Id. at 352. 
 14 See id. 
 15 Id. at 351. 
 16 See id. at 339. 
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In 2010, the Louisiana Supreme Court heard argument in a criminal case 
for a defendant charged with first-degree murder—a capital offense—and 
“five other counts” of noncapital offenses.17 In a terse, one-page opinion, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court stated, almost dismissively, that “[t]he joinder was 
improper at the outset.”18 
How can these jurisdictions come to such different conclusions on 
whether joinder is proper in relatively similar situations? Of course, each 
individual criminal case is unique, but the contrast between a detailed 
appellate analysis and a swift pronouncement of improper joinder is 
intriguing. 
In all state and federal jurisdictions in the United States, joinder allows 
prosecutors to join multiple offenses against a criminal defendant in one trial. 
Joinder pervades the American criminal justice system, and jurisdictions may 
see joinder in more than half of their cases.19 Most states and the federal 
courts use a liberal joinder system,20 where courts may join offenses 
regardless of punishment severity. Liberal joinder is based in judicial 
efficiency arguments premised on avoiding unnecessary trials and striving to 
conserve time, money, and other resources above all else. In such 
jurisdictions, courts may force a defendant to prepare for a trial in which she 
must simultaneously defend against a misdemeanor offense, like possession 
of marijuana, and a capital felony offense with a potential death sentence—
even though the two charges may require completely different defense 
strategies. 
Most U.S. jurisdictions have joinder and severance schemes that are 
somewhat similar to one another: they permit joinder of offenses when the 
offenses are based on the same act or transaction, are of the same or similar 
character, or are part of a common scheme or plan.21 Most jurisdictions 
 
 17 State v. Clarkson, 48 So. 3d 272, 273 (La. 2010). 
 18 Id. Despite the improper joinder at the outset of the prosecution because the defendant 
failed to raise a timely motion to quash and because the State forewent seeking capital 
punishment for the first-degree murder charge, the court held that the eventual joinder was 
proper. See id. 
 19 See generally Andrew D. Leipold & Hossein A. Abbasi, The Impact of Joinder and 
Severance on Federal Criminal Cases: An Empirical Study, 59 VAND. L. REV. 347, 363–65 
(2006) (finding that in the federal system over a five-year period, more than half of criminal 
defendants were charged with multiple crimes). 
 20 The use of the word “liberal” is not intended to invoke the political meaning of the term. 
The author uses the word “liberal” to mean that the regime is more generous with or broadly 
allows joinder. 
 21 See infra Part I.B. 
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originally based their joinder regimes on the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, which went into effect in 1946.22 
Generally, if either party feels the joinder is improper, they can use a 
jurisdiction’s severance provision to request that the court examine the 
joinder. After a severance request, the judge will most commonly 
determine—either, depending on the jurisdiction’s rules, in her discretion or 
by weighing the prejudice of the joinder against the public interest of judicial 
efficiency—whether severance is appropriate. A defendant who moves for 
severance of the offenses generally must meet a high burden to get the relief 
she seeks either at trial or on appeal.23 
Most jurisdictions have such a process to review potentially prejudicial 
joinder. But some states offer parties additional structural protections. 
Specifically, in Louisiana, prosecutors may not join a capital charge against 
a criminal defendant with a noncapital charge, which carry less severe 
punishments.24 
For decades, judges and scholars have argued for liberal joinder using 
judicial efficiency justifications. Other scholars and researchers, however, 
have criticized such joinder regimes by pointing out the ways in which 
joinder may prejudice defendants or presenting data to show empirical 
evidence of prejudice.25 Studies have found that juries can prejudice 
defendants by confusing the evidence of one offense with that of the joined 
offense or inferring the defendant’s criminality based on the multiple 
charges.26 By far the strongest point against joinder is that a defendant’s 
chance of conviction at trial rises merely from the state charging her with 
more than one offense.27 Despite these indicia of a burdensome system, no 
one has yet suggested that jurisdictions revise their joinder regimes to 
prohibit the joinder of capital and noncapital offenses. 
Jurisdictions should no longer broadly protect the joinder of all types of 
offenses under their regimes in the name of judicial efficiency or juridical 
discretion. Instead, jurisdictions should categorically protect defendants 
charged with capital offenses from the potential prejudice joinder can create, 
as Louisiana has for nearly a century. Born from the state’s unique judicial 
 
 22 See generally FED. R. CRIM. P.; 327 U.S. 821 (1946). Today, as in 1946, joinder in the 
federal system is governed by Rule 8, and relief from joinder is governed by Rule 14. See FED. 
R. CRIM. P. 8, 14. 
 23 See infra Part IV.F. 
 24 See LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 493 (2020) (stating that offenses may be joined 
provided that they are “triable by the same mode of trial”); infra Part III.B. 
 25 See infra Part IV.B. 
 26 See infra Part IV.B. 
 27 See infra Part IV.B. 
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history, Louisiana’s joinder regime restricted joinder to those offenses that 
courts can try by the same “mode of trial,”28 a phrase that has undergone 
statutory interpretation, constitutional examination, and judicial scrutiny. 
Louisiana offers its criminal defendants a categorical procedural protection 
by prohibiting the joinder of capital offenses with noncapital offenses. 
For jurisdictions that seek to address the growing body of scholarship 
on joinder’s negative impacts while continuing to honor arguments 
promoting judicial efficiency, prohibiting the joinder of capital and 
noncapital offenses provides a favorable solution. Further, jurisdictions—
particularly those that maintain the death penalty—should adopt a regime 
with a joinder restriction on capital and noncapital offenses to provide 
criminal defendants with an additional joinder protection not based on 
discretion alone. 
This Article first discusses the history and current status of joinder in 
common law jurisdictions, followed by the history and current status of 
joinder in Louisiana. It then explains capital-offense joinder in Louisiana and 
how it differs from other U.S. jurisdictions. The Article further analyzes the 
arguments for liberal joinder and critiques each by presenting field research, 
historical arguments, and practical considerations. The Article concludes by 
urging other jurisdictions, particularly those with capital-sentencing 
capabilities or capital-offense punishments, to amend their joinder provisions 
to categorically prohibit the joinder of capital offenses with noncapital 
offenses. 
If jurisdictions revise their joinder schemes in this way, they will 
maintain liberal joinder regimes for the most common criminal cases, where 
joinder is most efficient, without prejudicing those defendants who face the 
most serious consequences and the highest stakes during their trials. 
I. JOINDER AND SEVERANCE OF OFFENSES 
As a general matter in criminal procedure, joinder29 is the method of 
joining defendants, charges, or both within a formal accusation—typically 
either a bill of information or an indictment.30 Predictably, if joinder occurs, 
 
 28 See CRIM. PROC. art. 493. 
 29 Jurisdictions’ joinder rules explain in what instances joinder may be perfected, but do 
not define the term. The ever-helpful Black’s Law Dictionary defines “joinder” as “[t]he 
uniting of parties or claims in a single lawsuit.” Joinder, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 
2019). The term is believed to have been first used in the 17th century. Id. 
 30 Both a bill of information and an indictment serve as charging documents that begin 
criminal proceedings against a defendant. An indictment is first presented to a grand jury, 
while a bill of information is not. In the federal system, an indictment must be used if a charged 
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whatever parties, claims, or charges the court joined it may also “sever.” 
Severance is the method by which a party requests that the court try the 
previously joined parties, claims, or charges separately.31 Jurisdictions 
typically allow severance when the movant can show that a high level of 
prejudice or a conflict exists.32 One can term a jurisdiction’s rules, provisions, 
statutes, and case law governing joinder and severance its “joinder and 
severance regime.” 
Many jurisdictions’ joinder provisions address both joinder of offenses 
and joinder of defendants in the same rule or statute. Although the joinder of 
defendants may have negative effects, this Article will only discuss joinder 
of offenses33 because this Article’s proposed solution addresses only this 
aspect of joinder.34 
The joinder of offenses pervades the American criminal justice system. 
Prosecutors consistently use joinder when initiating proceedings against a 
defendant. One study found that, over a five-year period in the federal 
criminal system, the government charged more than half of the criminal 
defendants with multiple crimes in the same bill of information or 
indictment.35 Joinder’s prevalence prompted one commentator to note: “The 
 
felony is punishable either by death or imprisonment for more than one year. FED. R. CRIM. P. 
7(a)(1). 
 31 Similar to joinder, jurisdictions’ severance rules do not define the term. Black’s Law 
Dictionary defines “severance” as “[t]he separation of criminal charges or criminal defendants 
for trial, as when codefendants have conflicting defenses so that prejudice might result to one 
or more of them.” Severance, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). Note that this 
definition uses an example of “joinder of defendants.” Id. Even though this is one prong of 
joinder and severance in criminal procedure, this Article will focus on joinder of offenses only. 
 32 See infra Appendix B. 
 33 Naturally flowing from an understanding of the term “joinder,” “joinder of offenses” 
can be understood as charging a defendant with multiple crimes as separate counts in a single 
bill of information or indictment, resulting in the defendant being tried for the multiple crimes 
in the same trial. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “joinder of offenses” as “[t]he charging of 
an accused with two or more crimes as multiple counts in a single indictment or information.” 
Joinder of Offenses, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). The term is believed to have 
been first used in 1836. Id. 
 34 As additional notes on the limitations of this Article, scholars find that joinder in civil 
cases is even more liberal than in criminal cases. See Krystia Reed & Bryan H. Bornstein, 
Juries, Joinder, and Justice, JURY EXPERT, Aug. 2015, at 1; Robin J. Effron, The Shadow Rules 
of Joinder, 100 GEO. L.J. 759 (2012). This Article addresses only joinder of offenses in 
criminal cases. Further, the preclusion of prosecution against a defendant or the institution of 
constitutional double jeopardy protections may be impacted by the joinder or severance of 
offenses if a case returns to the trial stage. This Article does not address those potential 
consequences. 
 35 Leipold & Abbasi, supra note 19. Leipold and Abbasi do note, however, that this large 
number cannot determine “the status of defendants who actually went to trial.” Id. at 365. Still, 
the high usage of joinder shows its importance in criminal justice. 
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way in which the prosecutor chooses to combine offenses . . . in a single 
indictment is perhaps second in importance only to his decision to 
prosecute. . . . Equally decisive may be the number of offenses which are 
cumulated against a single defendant, particularly if they are unconnected.”36 
Despite joinder’s high usage and significance, legal scholarship in the 
area is sparse37 or narrow in scope.38 Further, law schools do not prepare 
 
 36 8 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 8.02[1] (2d ed. Supp. Aug. 1996). 
The quote’s alteration only omits portions discussing joinder of defendants. See id. 
 37 See, e.g., Andrew Manuel Crespo, The Hidden Law of Plea Bargaining, 118 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1303, 1317 n.44 (2018) (discussing the lack of attention to joinder in legal scholarship). 
Besides the Crespo article, which primarily addresses plea bargaining, there is one other 
notable piece on joinder published in the last decade. See Matthew Deates, Comment, Righting 
Categorical Wrongs: A Holistic Solution to Rule 8(a)’s Same-or-Similar-Character Prong, 85 
U. CHI. L. REV. 827 (2018). Most joinder scholarship is more than 30 years old. See, e.g., 
Robert O. Dawson, Joint Trials of Defendants in Criminal Cases: An Analysis of Efficiencies 
and Prejudices, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1379 (1979); Kevin P. Hein, Joinder and Severance, 30 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1139 (1993); Raymond T. Cullen Jr., Joinder of Counts as a Violation of an 
Accused’s Right to Remain Silent, 41 TEMP. L.Q. 458 (1968); Kenneth S. Bordens & Irwin A. 
Horowitz, Joinder of Criminal Offenses: A Review of the Legal and Psychological Literature, 
9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 339 (1985); Thomas C. Wales, Note, Harmless Error and Misjoinder 
under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: A Narrowing Division of Opinion, 6 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 533, 536–37 (1978); John F. Decker, Joinder and Severance in Federal Criminal 
Cases: An Examination of Judicial Interpretation of the Federal Rules, 53 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 147 (1977); James Farrin, Note, Rethinking Criminal Joinder: An Analysis of the 
Empirical Research and Its Implications for Justice, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 325 (1989); 
Note, Joint and Single Trials Under Rules 8 and 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, 74 YALE L.J. 553 (1965). One of the first federal criminal procedure scholar’s 
work with joinder, while significant at the time, is now aged. See, e.g., Lester B. Orfield, The 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 33 CALIF. L. REV. 543 (1945); Lester B. Orfield, Early 
Federal Criminal Procedure, 7 WAYNE L. REV. 503 (1961) [hereinafter Orfield, Early Federal 
Criminal Procedure]; Lester B. Orfield, Relief from Prejudicial Joinder in Federal Criminal 
Cases, 36 NOTRE DAME L. Rev. 276 (1961); Lester B. Orfield, Relief from Prejudicial Joinder 
in Federal Criminal Cases (Part II), 36 NOTRE DAME L. Rev. 495 (1961); Lester B. Orfield, 
A Note on Joinder of Offenses, 41 OR. L. REV. 128 (1962). 
 38 There are a handful of shorter published pieces on joinder. See, e.g., Paul C. Giannelli, 
Joinder & Severance of Offenses, PUBLIC DEFENDER REPORTER, Summer 1997; Reed & 
Bornstein, supra note 34, at 1. Further, some of the scholarship addresses joinder only in the 
context of a particular jurisdiction. See, e.g., Mark R. McDonald, Prejudicial Joinder Under 
California Penal Code Section 954: Judicial Economy at a Premium, 20 PAC. L.J. 1235 
(1989); Sean B. Hoar, Comment, Joinder of Offenses: A New Rule for Oregon, 66 OR. L. REV. 
953 (1987); Ryan C. Shotter, Comment, State V. Gonzales: Reinvigorating Criminal Joinder 
in New Mexico, 44 N.M. L. REV. 467 (2014); Samuel A. Baron, Note, A Look at the Tennessee 
Multiple Offender and the Joinder and Severance of Criminal Offenses for Trial, 7 MEM. ST. 
U. L. REV. 457 (1977). There is a strand of Louisiana-specific scholarship as well. See Gilbert 
Dupre Litton, Comment, Joinder of Criminal Offenses in Louisiana, 4 LA. L. REV. 127 (1941); 
Dale E. Bennett, Louisiana Criminal Procedure – A Critical Appraisal, 14 LA. L. REV. 11 
(1953); David S. Kelly, Comment, Joinder of Offenses: Louisiana’s New Approach in 
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future attorneys to discuss joinder in a meaningful way, as it is often ignored 
or not covered in criminal procedure courses39: “[C]asebooks give [joinder] 
short shrift as well, discussing it only briefly and with near-exclusive focus 
on the potential trial consequences of federal joinder rules.”40 
This lack of conversation is not a recent phenomenon. From the 
beginning of codified joinder regimes, commentators have noted the 
subject’s scholarly lethargy. One such commentator noted that during the 
thirty years following the federal joinder rules’ original introduction, joinder 
of offenses in the context of a single defendant “has never been seriously 
questioned.”41 
Joinder and severance regimes—whether liberal,42 restrictive,43 or 
somewhere in between—exist in every criminal jurisdiction in the United 
States.44 Some variation exists, but most jurisdictions’ regimes share many 
similarities.45 For joinder of multiple offenses that carry different potential 
sentences, most jurisdictions allow courts to permissively join all types of 
offenses, no matter the charged crimes’ potential sentence.46 One of the best 
 
Historical Perspective, 37 LA. L. REV. 203 (1976); Cheney C. Joseph Jr., Criminal Trial 
Procedure and Postconviction Procedure, 39 LA. L. REV. 933 (1978); Cheney C. Joseph Jr., 
Criminal Law and Procedure, 40 LA. L. REV. 635 (1980). 
 39 See, e.g., Crespo, supra note 37, at 1317 n.44 (discussing the lack of attention to joinder 
in criminal procedure courses); JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS III, CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES AND PERSPECTIVES 912–19 (4th ed. 2010); YALE KAMISAR, 
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, NANCY J. KING, ORIN S. KERR & EVE BRENSIKE 
PRIMUS, ADVANCED CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES, COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS 1062–89 
(14th ed. 2015); RONALD JAY ALLEN, WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, JOSEPH L. HOFFMANN, DEBRA A. 
LIVINGSTON, ANDREW D. LEIPOLD & TRACEY L. MEARES, COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE 1168–83 (4th ed. 2016). For instance, the criminal procedure casebook the author 
of this Article used, which derived from Criminal Procedure: Principles, Policies and 
Perspectives, kept a reference to “joinder of defendants and counts” in the index, but removed 
from the printed version the pages in which the joinder content could be found. See JOSHUA 
DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS III, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: INVESTIGATING CRIME, at xxv, 
1594 (6th ed. 2017). 
 40 Crespo, supra note 37, at 1317 n.44. 
 41 Wales, supra note 37, at 536–37. 
 42 A liberal joinder regime is generally understood as one in which the prosecution is 
allowed more freedom to join offenses in the same charging document. 
 43 Conversely, a restrictive joinder regime can be understood as one where the prosecution 
has less freedom to perform joinder. Normally, defendants would prefer restrictive joinder 
regimes: there is less chance of prejudice and the prosecution’s job is made harder. 
Commentators do note, however, that there might be instances in which a defendant prefers 
to have her multiple charges adjudicated in one trial. See, e.g., Farrin, supra note 37, at 327. 
 44 See infra Part II. 
 45 See infra Part II. 
 46 See infra Part II. 
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examples of this type of regime, and the origin of most other jurisdictions’ 
regimes, is the federal criminal system’s joinder provisions. 
A. HISTORY OF JOINDER IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure govern joinder in the federal 
courts today.47 However, this was not always the case. Prior to the Rules’ 
creation, the common law governed joinder of offenses, as well as all of the 
other criminal procedural elements the Federal Rules address.48 
Judicial procedural rulemaking in other contexts came as early as 
1791,49 but criminal procedure was one of the last areas codified by the 
Supreme Court.50 From the Founding, little federal legislative action took 
place on criminal procedure.51 Congress did not authorize the Supreme Court 
to promulgate rules “as to criminal proceedings after verdict” until 1933, and 
the Court put the power to use quickly when they issued post-verdict rules in 
1934.52 Not until 1940 did Congress give the Court power to create rules for 
criminal procedure prior to and including the verdict.53 The Court exercised 
this power by promulgating the 1944 Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
effective 1946.54 
 
 47 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 8, 14. 
 48 See Orfield, Early Federal Criminal Procedure, supra note 37, at 511. See also United 
States v. Dickinson, 25. F. Cas. 850, 850–51 (C.C.D. Ohio 1840) (No. 14,958); United States 
v. Peterson, 27 F. Cas. 515, 519 (C.C.D. Mass. 1846) (No. 16,037); United States v. 
O’Callahan, 27 F. Cas. 216, 216 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1855) (No. 15,910). 
 49 Orfield, Early Federal Criminal Procedure, supra note 37, at 503. Orfield writes: 
The Supreme Court from the very first could lay down rules of procedure as to proceedings 
before it. In 1791 it announced on motion of the attorney general that “this court consider the 
practice of the courts of king’s bench, and of chancery, in England, as affording outlines for 
the practice of this court; and that they will, from time to time, make alterations therein as 
circumstances may render necessary.” 
Id. (quoting 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) xvii (1801)). 
 50 Id. at 504. 
 51 Id. In 1931, the Hoover Commission on Criminal Law wrote, “In Federal criminal 
procedure legislation has interfered but little and has left the matter largely to judicial 
development of the common law, with the result that many things which embarrass 
prosecution in the State courts have never given trouble in the Federal courts.” NAT’L COMM’N 
ON L. OBSERVANCE AND ENF’T, REPORT ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 32 (1931). 
 52 47 Stat. 904 (1933), as amended in 48 Stat. 399 (1934); Orfield, Early Federal Criminal 
Procedure, supra note 37, at 504. See also Order, 292 U.S. 661, 661–66 (1934). 
 53 54 Stat. 688 (1940); Orfield, Early Federal Criminal Procedure, supra note 37, at 504. 
 54 An 1853 statute provided the textual basis for what would eventually become Federal 
Rule 8(a)—the federal joinder rule—in 1944. See Orfield, Early Federal Criminal Procedure, 
supra note 37, at 511. The statute provided that: 
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During the decades following the Federal Rules’ adoption, the Supreme 
Court and lower federal courts repeatedly acknowledged the federal joinder 
regime’s benefits.55 The result was a federal joinder and severance regime 
with jurisprudential support for its efficiency and economy. 
B. FEDERAL RULES 8, 14, AND 13 
Today, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(a) governs joinder of 
offenses in the federal system.56 Rule 8(a) provides that “the indictment or 
information may charge a defendant in separate counts when [two] or more 
offenses charged—whether felonies or misdemeanors or both—are of the 
same or similar character, or are based on the same act or transaction, or are 
 
Whenever there are or shall be several charges against any person or persons for the same act 
or transaction, or for two or more acts or transactions connected together, or for two or more 
acts or transactions of the same class of crimes or offences which may be properly joined, 
instead of having several indictments, the whole may be joined in one indictment in separate 
counts; and if two or more indictments shall be found in such cases, the court may order them 
consolidated. 
10 Stat. 162 (1853). It was not until 1894, in Pointer v. United States, that the Supreme Court 
commented on this 1853 statute. Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 411 (1894). The court 
stated that the statute “leaves the court to determine whether, in a given case, a joinder of two 
or more offenses in one indictment against the same person is consistent with the settled 
principles of criminal law.” Id. This was the first time the Court acknowledged a judge’s 
discretion to allow the joinder of two or more offenses: a standard that exists, at least at some 
level, today. See generally id. Although the Court, in 1827, spoke to relief from prejudicial 
joinder for the first time in the context of joinder of defendants, the Court did not explicitly 
address relief from prejudicial joinder of offenses. See United States v. Marchant, 25 U.S. (12 
Wheat.) 480, 480 (1827) (addressing separate trials of “two or more persons jointly charged 
in the same indictment with a capital offense,” the Court said: “The subject is not provided for 
by any act of Congress; and, therefore, if the right can be maintained at all, it must be as a 
right derived from the common law, which the Courts of the United States are bound to 
recognise and enforce.”); Orfield, Early Federal Criminal Procedure, supra note 37, at 514. 
 55 See, e.g., Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 209 (1987) (“Joint trials play a vital role 
in the criminal justice system, . . . ”); id. at 218 (“The concern about the cost of joint trials, 
even if valid, does not prevail over the interests of justice.”); Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 
534, 537 (1993) (“Joint trials ‘play a vital role in the criminal justice system.’ . . . [W]e 
repeatedly have approved of joint trials.” (citing Richardson, 481 U.S. at 209)); Bruton v. 
United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135. (1968); Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 95 (1954); 
United States v. Bryan, 843 F.2d 1339, 1342 (11th Cir. 1988); United States v. Eufrasio, 935 
F.2d 553, 568 (3d Cir. 1991) (“The public interest in judicial economy favors joint 
trials . . . .”); United States v. Werner, 620 F.2d 922, 928 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. 
Butler, 822 F.2d 1191, 1194 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Parker v. United States, 404 F.2d 1193, 1196 
(9th Cir. 1968). Although some of the federal cases involve the joinder of defendants, that has 
not prevented other jurisdictions from using the same efficiency arguments in the context of 
joinder of offenses. See Appendices A, B, infra. 
 56 FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(a). 
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connected with or constitute parts of a common scheme or plan.”57 Under 
this provision, courts may join any offenses that meet one of the requirements 
linking the offenses together—that the offenses “are of the same or similar 
character, or are based on the same act or transaction, or are connected with 
or constitute parts of a common scheme or plan”—in the same indictment or 
bill of information.58 
If one of the defined categories does not connect the two offenses, then 
joinder is improper and is classified as “misjoinder.” If misjoinder occurs, 
the judge will rule that she may not join the offenses for one trial or, if on 
appeal, that the joinder of the offenses was improper at the outset. Although 
the judge will determine whether the offenses are sufficiently linked under 
Rule 8(a)’s meaning, this review is different from a discretionary review for 
prejudicial joinder, which is an analysis only undertaken if a court may 
properly join the offenses, but a party moves for severance.59 
Rule 14 governs severance.60 In instances where joinder is proper but 
joinder may prejudice a party—either the defendant or the government—that 
party may move for severance of the offenses under Rule 14(a), and the court 
can order separate trials on the individual counts.61 Severance under this 
provision is “entirely in the discretion of the court.”62 The judge, in using that 
discretion, is meant to balance the possibility of prejudice to a party against 
the needs of and desire to facilitate judicial economy.63 When the Court 
codified Rule 14 in 1944, they intended the Rule to restate the prevailing law 
 
 57 Id. The 1944 Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules state that the Rule is “substantially 
a restatement of existing law.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 8 advisory committee’s note to 1944 adoption. 
The Rule has only been amended once, in 2002, since its original enactment in 1944. FED. R. 
CRIM. P. 8(a). That amendment came about “as part of the general restyling of the Criminal 
Rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent 
throughout the rules.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 8 advisory committee’s note to 2002 amendment. The 
changes were “intended to be stylistic only.” Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Compare id. with FED. R. CRIM. P. 14(a). 
 60 FED. R. CRIM. P. 14(a). The Rule provides that “[i]f the joinder of offenses or defendants 
in an indictment, an information, or a consolidation for trial appears to prejudice a defendant 
or the government, the court may order separate trials of counts, sever the defendants’ trials, 
or provide any other relief that justice requires.” Id. Rule 14(a) has been amended twice since 
its original enactment in 1944. Id. A 1966 amendment provided a procedure to address 
possible prejudice issues on a motion for severance related to codefendants. FED. R. CRIM. P. 
14(a) advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment. A 2002 amendment, similar to that of 
Rule 8(a), restyled Rule 14 “to make [it] more easily understood.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 14(a) 
advisory committee’s note to 2002 amendment. 
 61 FED. R. CRIM. P. 14(a). 
 62 Id. 
 63 See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 822 F.2d 1191, 1194 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
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at the time, which allowed for this unfettered discretion of judges to decide 
whether joinder was prejudicial.64 
Finally, Rule 13 governs instances where the defendant wants, for 
various reasons, to consolidate more than one separate charging document 
into one trial.65 Here, the law provides the defendant an opportunity to 
combine all charges that otherwise could have been brought in one bill of 
information or indictment into one trial.66 Under the federal regime, courts 
may join offenses so long as they meet one of Rule 8(a)’s linking 
requirements.67 
Rule 8(a) states that courts may join offenses “whether felonies or 
misdemeanors or both.”68 As such, the level of offenses to be joined are 
irrelevant: courts may join a felony with a felony, a misdemeanor with a 
misdemeanor, a felony with a misdemeanor, and so on. In effect, although 
Rule 8(a) defines some causal and temporal boundaries on which offenses 
courts may join, the potential punishments the offenses bear do not factor at 
all in the consideration of misjoinder of the offenses. Courts may take such a 
consideration into account when assessing whether severance is applicable 
and whether prejudice exists under Rule 14. But as a practical matter, judges 
in the federal system rarely find prejudice or grant severance, and a 
defendant’s burden of persuasion on appeal that a severance was necessary 
is incredibly high.69 The result is a joinder and severance regime that values 
the commission of multiple offenses’ interconnectivity but not the potential 
prejudice that a defendant may suffer at trial from a prosecutor charging her 
with an incredibly serious offense and a relatively minor offense. 
II. JOINDER AND SEVERANCE IN MOST JURISDICTIONS 
Today, all states have at least one provision or case governing joinder 
and severance. Whether the state’s primary provision on the subject is a court 
rule, statute, or case, most have a joinder and severance regime that parallels 
the language of Federal Rules 8 and 14. States with regimes that contain the 
“felonies or misdemeanors or both” language naturally carry forward the 
 
 64 FED. R. CRIM. P. 14(a). The 1944 Notes of the Advisory Committee cite to the existing 
law at the time. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 14(a) advisory committee’s note to 1944 adoption (citing 
18 U.S.C. [former] 557 (Indictments and presentments; joinder of charges); Pointer v. United 
States, 151 U.S. 396 (1894); Pierce v. United States, 160 U.S. 355 (1896); United States v. 
Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 673 (1896); Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 585–86 (1919)). 
 65 FED. R. CRIM. P. 13. 
 66 Id. 
 67 See id. 
 68 FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(a). 
 69 See infra Part IV.F. 
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prosecutorial discretion to charge all offenses, no matter the level of 
punishment, in a single charging document. Further, the only remedy these 
states often provide is a judge’s decision on whether the judge should sever 
the joined offenses. Even where a state’s joinder regime language differs 
from the federal regime—by not including the precise “felonies or 
misdemeanors or both” language—almost all state jurisdictions explicitly or 
implicitly allow the joinder of offenses with differing levels of punishment. 
There are twenty-four state jurisdictions that adopted and maintain the 
“felonies or misdemeanors or both” language used in the Federal Rules.70 
Even without the exact “felonies or misdemeanors or both” language, six 
jurisdictions’ joinder regimes still significantly track the federal regime in 
language and effect.71 And though one cannot say that their language shares 
express similarities with the Federal Rules, nineteen states’ regimes have the 
same effect of allowing the joinder of all types of offenses, regardless of their 
level of punishment.72 Some jurisdictions also, either explicitly or implicitly, 
adopted language from the American Bar Association’s73 or Model Penal 
Code’s74 recommended joinder and severance provisions, which both allow 
 
 70 The states that maintain the “felonies or misdemeanors or both” language are: Alabama, 
Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, 
Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Rhode Island, South 
Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See 
Appendix, A.1, infra. 
 71 Some jurisdictions’ regimes, while bearing a striking resemblance to the Federal Rules, 
differ slightly in the terminology related to their “felonies or misdemeanors or both” language. 
Those states are: Maine, Missouri, Nevada, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. See 
Appendix, A.2, infra. 
 72 The states that do not have the “felonies or misdemeanors or both” language or similar 
language, but still allow for the joinder of offenses no matter their punishment are: Arizona, 
California, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, and Texas. See Appendix, A.3, infra. 
 73 See ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, JOINDER & SEVERANCE, § 13-2.1 (2d ed. 1980) 
(“Any two or more offenses committed by the same defendant: (a) may be joined in one 
accusatory instrument, with each offenses stated in a separate count; or (b) may be joined for 
trial, upon the application of the prosecuting attorney or the defense.”); Id. at § 13-3.1 (“The 
court . . . should grant a severance of related offenses: . . . whenever severance is deemed 
appropriate to promote a fair determination of the defendant’s guilt or innocence of each 
offense.”). 
 74 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07(1) (AM. L. INST. 1985) (“When the same conduct of a 
defendant may establish the commission of more than offense, the defendant may be 
prosecuted for each such offense.”); id. § 1.07(3) (“When a defendant is charged with two or 
more offenses based on the same conduct or arising from the same criminal episode, the Court, 
on application of the prosecuting attorney or of the defendant, may order such charge to be 
tried separately, if it is satisfied that justice so requires.”). 
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for the joinder of all types of offenses and grant the trial judge discretion to 
determine whether severance is appropriate. 
Even with variations in language, each jurisdiction allows for the 
joinder of offenses no matter the potential level of punishment of those 
offenses. Whereas most states explicitly allow for the joinder of “felonies or 
misdemeanors or both,” every other jurisdiction—save Louisiana—at a 
minimum implicitly allows courts to join any of those offenses. Further, the 
only remedy for defendants charged with different-punishment offenses in 
all of these jurisdictions is a judge’s discretion following a motion for 
severance—a discretion which often rules in favor of judicial efficiency and, 
thus, against severance.75 
Some jurisdictions’ joinder and severance regimes carry unique 
conditions, histories, and characteristics. Although these regimes’ 
idiosyncrasies are different from the traditional “felonies or misdemeanors 
or both” framework, Louisiana remains the only jurisdiction to categorically 
prohibit the joinder of capital and noncapital offenses. For instance, Arkansas 
had a nonjoinder regime until 2005.76 Until then, it restricted an indictment 
to only one offense, although it excluded particular offenses from the 
restriction, and the prosecutor could allege “different modes and means in 
the alternative.”77 Today, Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 21.1 allows 
for the joinder of offenses “whether felonies or misdemeanors or both.”78 
Another example is Oklahoma, where a statute provides that an 
indictment or information “must charge but one offense” but allows for the 
joinder of multiple offenses in separate counts when the same acts could 
constitute multiple offenses or the evidence is unclear as to which offense the 
defendant may be guilty.79 But this statute, while still codified, is no longer 
considered binding and a joinder statute passed in 1968 superseded it.80 
 
 75 Every jurisdiction has some level of review for prejudice of joinder. Most jurisdictions 
make it clear that a defendant’s burden of proving that a severance should have been granted 
in her case is incredibly high. See Appendix, B, infra. 
 76 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-85-404 (1987), repealed by Arkansas Criminal Code 
Revision Commission’s Bill, 2005 Ark. Acts 1994. The now-repealed statute provided that: 
“An indictment, except in cases mentioned in subsection (b) of this section, must charge but 
one (1) offense, but, if it may have been committed in different modes and by different means, 
the indictment may allege the modes and means in the alternative.” Id. 
 77 See id. 
 78 ARK. R. CRIM. P. 21.1. See also infra Appendix A. 
 79 OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 404 (2019). 
 80 See OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 436 (2019); Glass v. State, 701 P.2d 765, 768 (Okla. Crim. 
App. 1985); Dodson v. State, 562 P.2d 916, 923 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977) (Brett, J., specially 
concurring). Judge Brett’s concurrence analyzed § 436 and determined that the Oklahoma 
Legislature intended to allow the joinder of offenses, in addition to the joinder of defendants. 
See Dodson, 562 P.2d at 923 (Brett, J., specially concurring). 
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Indeed, prior to 1968, Oklahoma upheld a rigid nonjoinder regime.81 Today, 
however, many Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals opinions cite Glass v. 
State, which found that “joinder of offenses [was] now permissible under 
Oklahoma law . . . .”82 Thus, in effect, Oklahoma’s regime now allows the 
joinder all offenses, no matter their level of punishment.83 
And in Texas, defendants have a universal right of severance, but there 
is no outright prohibition on joinder.84 Such a regime—where the prosecution 
may join any applicable offenses they wish, and the defendant can “counter” 
by severing all offenses they do not wish the State to try together—seems to 
perfectly promote judicial efficiency while protecting the defendant against 
potential prejudice from the joinder of offenses. The Texas Legislature, 
however, created several exceptions to the general rule of universal 
severability.85 Further, if the defendant uses the universal severance right, she 
loses the guarantee that her sentences, if convicted of multiple offenses, 
would run concurrently.86 As such, a defendant effectively gives up a 
protection when choosing to exercise her severance right. This places an 
additional, stressful factor on a defendant’s decision process—a factor with 
which Louisiana defendants need not wrestle. 
III. JOINDER AND SEVERANCE IN LOUISIANA 
At first glance, Louisiana’s joinder regime also has similar language to 
the Federal Rules, and the Louisiana legislature even used the Federal Rules 
as guidance for their provision.87 The Louisiana legislature, however, 
included an additional clause allowing for joinder of offenses “provided that 
 
 81 See Kramer v. State, 257 P.2d 521, 523 (Okla. Crim. App. 1953). 
 82 Glass, 701 P.2d at 768. 
 83 See Appendix A, infra. 
 84 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 3.04 (West 2019). The primary provision provides that: 
“Whenever two or more offenses have been consolidated or joined for trial under Section 3.02, 
the defendant shall have a right to a severance of the offenses.” Id. § 3.04(a). 
 85 See id. §§ 3.03(b); 3.04(c). Section 3.04(c) states that “[t]he right to severance under 
this section does not apply to a prosecution for offenses described by Section 3.03(b) . . . .” 
Id. § 3.04(c). Section 3.03(b) lists and references offenses like intoxication assault or 
manslaughter; sexual abuse crimes, particularly of minors; and trafficking of persons. See id. 
§ 3.03(b). 
 86 See id. §§ 3.03; 3.04(b). 
 87 See LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 493, 495.1 (2019); Kelly, supra note 38 at 215–
16; State v. McZeal, 352 So. 2d 592, 600–01 (La. 1977). Louisiana’s joinder provision reads, 
in part, “Two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment or information in a 
separate count for each offense if the offenses charged, whether felonies or 
misdemeanors, . . . ” CRIM. PROC. art. 493. 
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the offenses joined must be triable by the same mode of trial.”88 The effect 
of that language led to an incredibly different joinder outcome. 
Although Louisiana’s joinder provision does share language similarities 
with other American jurisdictions, its “mode of trial” language has a 
profound effect. With it, Louisiana categorically prohibited the joinder of 
capital offenses with noncapital offenses. To properly contextualize this 
difference, one must examine joinder’s history in Louisiana. 
A. HISTORY OF JOINDER IN LOUISIANA 
What one author wrote in 1941 still rings true: “The problem of joinder 
of criminal offenses in Louisiana has struggled through an interesting 
cycle.”89 Before Louisiana adopted its 1928 Code of Criminal Procedure,90 
Louisiana had a similar default joinder rule to that of other U.S. 
jurisdictions.91 It allowed for the joinder of two or more offenses in one 
indictment, so long as they were part of the same criminal act or continuous 
unlawful transaction and had the same method of trial and appeal.92 
 
 88 CRIM. PROC. art. 493. 
 89 Litton, supra note 38, at 127. 
 90 New Criminal Code, 1928 La. Acts. 4; Bennett, supra note 38, at 11. 
 91 Litton, supra note 38, at 127–28. See also Johnson v. State, 29 Ala. 62 (1856); Lascelles 
v. State, 16 S.E. 945 (1892); State v. Houx, 19 S.W. 35 (1891); Porath v. State, 63 N.W. 1061 
(1895); Bell v. State, 48 Ala. 684, 694 (1874); Ben v. State, 58 Am. Dec. 234, 247 (1853) 
(reporter notes); State v. Fitzsimon, 49 Am. St. Rep. 766, 771 (1893) (reporter notes). 
 Some readers may be aware that, despite some similarities today, the state of Louisiana’s 
civil system of law comes from the civilian tradition, sharing more characteristics with 
mainland European, Central American, and South American jurisdictions than with Anglo-
American common law jurisdictions. See, e.g., Harriet Spiller Daggett, Joseph Dainow, Paul 
M. Hébert & Henry George McMahon, A Reappraisal Appraised: A Brief for the Civil Law of 
Louisiana, 12 TUL. L. REV. 12, 12–14 (1937–38); A.N. Yiannopoulos, Common, Public and 
Private Things in Louisiana: Civilian Tradition and Modern Practice, 21 LA. L. REV. 697, 
697–98 (1961); Mack E. Barham, A Renaissance of the Civilian Tradition In Louisiana, 33 
LA. L. REV. 357, 357–58 (1972); A.N. Yiannopoulos, Louisiana Civil Law: A Lost Cause?, 54 
TUL. L. REV. 830, 830 (1980); Kenneth M. Murchison, The Judicial Revival of Louisiana’s 
Civilian Tradition: A Surprising Triumph for the American Influence, 49 LA. L. REV 1, 1 
(1988). Louisiana’s criminal system origins, however, are similar to other states’ and the 
federal system’s Anglo-American roots that other Americans are more familiar with. See, e.g., 
Leon D. Hubert, Jr., History of Louisiana Criminal Procedure, 33 TUL. L. REV. 739, 740 
(1959); John T. Hood, Jr., A Crossroad in Louisiana History, 22 LA. L. REV. 709, 724 (1962). 
 92 See generally State v. Crosby, 4 La. Ann. 434, 434–35 (1849); State v. McLane, 4 La. 
Ann. 435, 437 (1849); State v. Laque, 37 La. Ann. 853, 856 (1885); State v. Thornton, 77 So. 
634, 635 (La. 1918); State v. Moultrie, 33 La. Ann. 1146, 1148 (1881); State v. Malloy, 30 
La. Ann. 61, 62 (1878); State v. Depass, 31 La. Ann. 487, 488 (1879); State v. Green, 37 La. 
Ann. 382, 383 (1885); State v. Cook, 7 So. 64, 65 (La. 1890); State v. Gilkie, 35 La. Ann. 53, 
54 (1883); Kelly, supra note 38; Litton, supra note 38. 
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1. Pre-Code Jurisprudential Misjoinder 
A leading pre-Code case applying the default rule was State v. Hataway, 
where the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed a conviction of a defendant 
charged with burglary and grand larceny—crimes that bore different types of 
sentences.93 The Court stated: “[T]he rule that two or more crimes, if 
committed in one transaction, may be charged in one indictment, is subject 
to the qualification that the two or more crimes so charged ‘are subject to the 
same mode of trial and nature of punishment.’”94 As the Court articulated, 
one of its primary concerns for limiting the joinder of the offenses to those 
“subject to the same mode of trial and nature of punishment” stemmed from 
the different jury size requirements of the two offenses. 
At the time of Hataway and even today, Louisiana required different 
jury sizes and concurrence requirements for different classes of offenses.95 
The Court went on to say later in the opinion: 
It cannot be that a district attorney or a grand jury, . . . can, by cumulating the case with 
a prosecution for another crime, deprive the accused party of his constitutional right to 
be tried either by a jury of five or by the judge alone, at his option, and deprive him 
also of the guarantee of a unanimous verdict in his case.96 
In Hataway, the prosecution charged the defendant with burglary—
triable by a nonunanimous twelve-person jury—and larceny, triable by a 
unanimous five-person jury.97 Concerned with the prosecution’s potential 
power to selectively choose which jury size and concurrence requirement 
best suited its case, the Court ruled that offenses must be subject to the same 
mode of trial, meaning that they required the same size and concurrence 
requirement of their jury, for the court to properly join them.98 
 
 93 State v. Hataway, 96 So. 556, 556, 562–63 (La. 1923). 
 94 Id. at 557. 
 95 Louisiana, until recently, did not require unanimous jury verdicts in some felony cases. 
See 2019 La. Acts 722. For a great discussion of Louisiana’s unfortunate history with 
nonunanimous jury verdicts, which in part led to the recent constitutional amendment to 
require unanimous jury verdicts in trials of felonies that may be punished at hard labor, see 
generally THOMAS AIELLO, JIM CROW’S LAST STAND: NONUNANIMOUS CRIMINAL JURY 
VERDICTS IN LOUISIANA (2015). See also LA. CONST. art. I, § 17. 
 96 Hataway, 96 So. at 558. 
 97 Id. Readers will be familiar with the relatively recent constitutional amendment to 
Louisiana’s jury concurrence requirements. However, the amendment did not address jury 
concurrence requirements in the context of joinder and severance. See text accompanying note 
164–167, infra. 
 98 Hataway, 96 So. at 558. 
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2. The 1928 Code of Criminal Procedure and Its Fallout 
In 1928, Louisiana adopted its first Code of Criminal Procedure, which 
included joinder provisions.99 Article 218 required joinder in separate counts 
of the charging document of each offense, no matter the type, that arose out 
of a single criminal act or continuous unlawful transaction.100 One early 
commentator suggested that the article was “apparently intended” to provide 
a more liberal joinder rule than previously used, as it did not contain any of 
Hataway’s restrictive language.101 However, other scholars have noted that 
it is not clear if that intention existed.102 
A separate provision, Article 217, restricted joinder of offenses to only 
those instances where the Code elsewhere specifically listed a joinder 
exception—like Article 218.103 In effect, this new regime prohibited joinder 
of most unrelated offenses, yet required it when the offenses arose out of the 
same criminal act or continuous unlawful transaction—a substantial shift 
from the prior rule.104 The Louisiana Supreme Court’s early jurisprudence on 
Article 218 was chaotic.105 Instead of unquestioningly approving the new 
joinder regime, the Court found ways in which to combat the shift from the 
old rule. 
First, the Court applied Article 218 literally, holding that prosecutors 
must include two charges arising out of the same criminal act or continuous 
unlawful transaction in the same indictment under the Article, and thus they 
must prosecute those charges in the same trial.106 If the state did not prosecute 
the charges in the same trial, it could not press those omitted charges in later 
prosecutions.107 
 
 99 See New Criminal Code, 1928 La. Acts. 4; New Criminal Code arts. 217–18. 
 100 New Criminal Code art. 218. 
 101 Litton, supra note 38, at 129. 
 102 See Kelly, supra note 38, at 207 n.24 (citing Benjamin Wall Dart, Preface to LA. CODE 
CRIM. PROC. ANN. at iii (Benjamin Wall Dart ed. 1932) as evidence of uncertainty of what 
laws were in effect at time of 1928 codification); Case Comment, Constitutional Law—
Criminal Law—Evidence—Coroner’s Inquest—Admissibility in Homicide Cases to Prove the 
Cause of Death—Art. 35, Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure of 1928, 6 TUL. L. REV. 140, 
141–42 (1931). 
 103 New Criminal Code art. 217. 
 104 Id. arts. 217–18; Kelly, supra note 38, at 206. 
 105 For a great, more in-depth recounting of the messy historical development of Louisiana 
joinder, see Litton, supra note 38, at 127–31; Bennett, supra note 38, at 11–12, 18–19; Kelly, 
supra note 38, at 204–18. 
 106 State v. Roberts, 129 So. 144, 146 (La. 1930). The prosecution brought two separate 
indictments, but the defendant successfully argued his motion to quash. Id. at 147. 
 107 Id. 
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Second, the Court found opportunities to restate its favored Hataway 
principle. In two separate cases in which the prosecution joined two crimes, 
as required by Article 218, the Court took the opportunities to still require 
that joined offenses bear the same mode of trial.108 Both cases involved a 
defendant charged with an offense triable by a five-person jury and an 
offense triable by a twelve-person jury, just as in Hataway, and the Court 
found the joinder impermissible in both cases.109 
And third—further confusing Article 218’s interpretation—the Court 
held just one year later in State v. Jacques that the Article was 
unconstitutional.110 A disparity in treatment existed for defendants depending 
on the seriousness of the offenses charged, the Court reasoned, particularly 
because the offenses had different jury size and concurrence requirements.111 
Because Article 218 made joinder mandatory in some instances, the Article 
violated the State Constitution by not addressing the differences in jury 
requirements.112 The Court rationalized that the legislature must have 
intended for courts to read and invoke Article 218 either in its entirety or not 
at all.113 Although the Court did not say so, the justices seemed committed to 
 
 108 See State v. Hill, 130 So. 865, 865–66 (La. 1930); State v. O’Banion, 131 So. 34, 35 
(La. 1930). 
 109 See Hill, 130 So. at 865; O’Banion, 131 So. at 35. The Court stated in Hill that “it does 
not follow, as contended by the state, that defendant may be tried, at the same time, for 
burglary and larceny before a jury of twelve members, and convicted of larceny.” Hill, 130 
So. at 865. 
 110 State v. Jacques, 132 So. 657, 658 (La. 1931). The prosecution charged the defendant 
in a single indictment for two crimes—murder and robbery. Id. at 657. Although the two 
crimes were, indeed, part of the same transaction, the defendant argued in his motion to quash 
that the Article was unconstitutional, as it violated Article VII, § 41 of the Louisiana 
Constitution. Id. At the time, Article VII, § 41 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921 read in 
part that: 
All cases in which the punishment may not be at hard labor shall, until otherwise provided by law, 
be tried by the judge without a jury. Cases, in which the punishment may be at hard labor, shall 
be tried by a jury of five, all of whom must concur to render a verdict; cases, in which the 
punishment is necessarily at hard labor, by a jury of twelve, nine of whom must concur to render 
a verdict; cases in which the punishment may be capital, by a jury of twelve, all of whom must 
concur to render a verdict. 
LA. CONST. art. VII, § 41 (1921). The Court agreed with the defendant. Jacques, 132 So. at 
658. 
 111 Id. In Jacques, the murder charge required a unanimous jury verdict, whereas the 
robbery, because it was classified as only “a felony necessarily punishable at hard labor,” only 
required a 9-out-of-12 juror verdict. See id. With this difference in the modes of trial, the 
joinder could not stand and, further, the Article could not pass constitutional muster. Id. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. 
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the idea that, because of Louisiana’s different jury types, the joinder of 
offenses across different jury-type lines was unjustified. 
The Court’s harsh conclusion on Article 218 in Jacques did not stand 
for long, however, and the Court quickly recanted in State v. White.114 There, 
the prosecution charged the defendant with two murders arising out of the 
same transaction.115 Withdrawing from their severe conclusion in Jacques, 
the Court realized that there were instances where there could be no 
constitutional objection to joinder, particularly to crimes that arose out of the 
same transaction and that courts could try by the same mode of trial.116 
After White, Article 218 seemed to authorize the joinder of two or more 
offenses so long as they had the same method of trial and appeal.117 If the 
offenses did not share those things, then the Article was unconstitutional as 
applied.118 In effect, this ultimate rule marked a return to the Hataway rule, 
which only allowed joinder of offenses that shared the same mode of trial 
and appeal.119 
3. Article 218’s Repeal 
In response, the Louisiana Legislature repealed Article 218 in 1932, just 
four years after its introduction.120 The legislature, however, left some of the 
joinder provisions intact, creating a piecemeal joinder regime.121 Despite 
 
 114 State v. White, 136 So. 47, 48–49 (La. 1931). 
 115 Id. at 47. 
 116 See id. at 48–49. Despite the defendant’s appeal resting on Jacques’s 
unconstitutionality grounds, the Court, realizing the sweeping nature of its previous decision, 
stated: “It is clear, therefore, that no constitutional objection can be urged against the inclusion 
in one indictment in separate counts of two murders, or other crimes of the same nature, when 
such crimes result from one continuous unlawful transaction, and are triable and punishable 
alike.” Id. 
 117 See id. at 48–49 (upholding Article 218). 
 118 See Jacques, 132 So. at 658 (rejecting Article 218). 
 119 See State v. Hataway, 96 So. 556, 559 (La. 1923); Litton, supra note 38, at 130. 
 120 1932 La. Acts 508. The legislature did not provide a particular reason for repealing 
Article 218. One early commentator believed it was repealed because “the legislature, aware 
of the conflicting jurisprudence interpreting it, sought to terminate this legal turmoil.” Litton, 
supra note 38, at 131. Another commentator of the time believed that the repeal was 
“motivated by an exaggerated fear that the test of ‘one continuous unlawful transaction’ was 
too uncertain.” Bennett, supra note 38, at 19. Regardless of the reason behind the legislature’s 
repeal, it left a hole in Louisiana’s joinder regime that the courts needed to fill. 
 121 One commentator of the time called this occurrence “[o]ne of the most serious 
deficiencies in our present criminal procedures.” Bennett, supra note 38, at 14. 
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repealing Article 218, Article 217 remained and prohibited joinder unless 
another exception in a different Article in the Code permitted it.122 
Following Article 218’s repeal, the Louisiana Supreme Court used the 
previously controlling common law rule and the rule that it created through 
Jacques and White. The Court continuously found that courts could join 
offenses so long as they called for the same mode of trial and otherwise 
signaled that the Hataway principle prevailed.123 
This signified a continuation, in the Court’s mind, of the pre-Article 218 
common law rule for joinder. Despite the reversion to the prevailing common 
law approach, the Court continued to find Article 217 applicable when 
separate offenses must have been charged in separate indictments, unless an 
express statutory exception permitting joinder existed.124 The result was a 
disorganized approach to joinder, where the dominant article expressly 
denied joinder unless an exception—the primary example of which, Article 
218, was no longer in the Code—applied. 
Commentators began expressing dissatisfaction with the joinder regime, 
arguing that Louisiana should again adopt a more permissive joinder rule 
rather than keep the restrictive Article 217 as it stood.125 The Louisiana 
Legislature adopted a new Code of Criminal Procedure in 1966, but the 
joinder provisions appeared substantially similar to the joinder regime 
following the repeal of Article 218.126 That is, the principal article, Article 
493 of the 1966 Code, appeared almost identical to Article 217 of the 1928 
Code in that it prohibited joinder unless statutorily authorized elsewhere.127 
This offered no development of Louisiana’s joinder regime or concessions to 
 
 122 See New Criminal Code, 1928 La. Acts. 4 art. 217. Prior to its repeal, Article 218 was 
the primary exception to Article 217. 
 123 For instance, in a case following the repeal, State v. Turner, the Court opined on the 
non-dispositive misjoinder issue: 
Even had the complaint been properly pleaded we do not think that the indictment is amendable 
to the charge of duplicity. The repeal of article 218 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act No. 
153 of 1932), relating to charging two or more offenses in distinct counts, does not have the effect 
of repealing the rule at common law as to charging such offenses. 
State v. Turner, 152 So. 567, 571 (La. 1934) (emphasis added). 
 124 See, e.g., State v. Cannon, 169 So. 446, 448 (La. 1936); State v. Carter, 19 So. 2d 41, 
44 (La. 1944) (citing and referencing Cannon). 
 125 Ralph Slovenko, The Accusation in Louisiana Criminal Law, 32 TUL. L. REV. 47, 70–
71 (1957); Dale E. Bennett, Revision of Louisiana’s Code of Criminal Procedure-A Survey of 
the Some of the Problems, 18 LA. L. REV. 383, 397–99 (1958); Dale E. Bennett, Blind Spots 
in the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure, 1 LA. BAR J. 62, 66 (1954); Litton, supra note 
38, at 132. 
 126 See Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure, 1966 La. Acts. 1. 
 127 Compare id. at art. 493 with New Criminal Code, 1928 La. Acts. 4 art. 217. 
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commentators suggesting someone change the rule, as the primary article still 
expressly prohibited joinder. 
4. 1975 Amendment and Interpretation 
Not long after, in 1975, the Louisiana legislature again amended the 
Code of Criminal Procedure’s joinder provisions.128 The amendments 
drastically changed the joinder regime, departing from the rule that joinder 
of offenses was generally impermissible—a rule perpetuated since the repeal 
of Article 218 in 1932. The legislature amended Article 493 to provide for 
permissive joinder of offenses, whether the offenses are “of the same or 
similar character,” are “based on the same act or transaction, or “on two or 
more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a 
common scheme or plan; provided that the offenses joined must be triable by 
the same mode of trial.”129 
Shortly after the amendment to Article 493, the Louisiana Supreme 
Court heard argument in a case invoking the newly amended Article.130 That 
case, State v. McZeal, dealt with a defendant charged with aggravated rape 
and armed robbery in the same indictment.131 A twelve-person jury 
unanimously convicted McZeal of both crimes.132 The defendant argued that 
the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash and maintained that the 
court misjoined the two offenses under Article 493.133 He argued that the two 
offenses—aggravated rape and armed robbery—were not triable by the same 
“mode of trial.”134 The phrase “mode of trial” had only just entered the 
Article in 1975 and a court had not yet interpreted it. McZeal argued that 
aggravated rape, a felony with a potential capital sentence, was triable by a 
twelve-person jury requiring a unanimous verdict to convict, but that armed 
robbery, a felony necessarily punishable at hard labor, only required ten of 
twelve jurors to convict.135 The different jury conviction requirements, the 
defendant contended, were the basis for the different “modes of trial” 
 
 128 1975 La. Acts. 1107 §§ 1, 2. 
 129 Id. at § 2. Although other articles around it have been amended since, Article 493 has 
not changed since its amendment in 1975. See LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 493 (2020). 
 130 State v. McZeal, 352 So. 2d 592, 593 (La. 1977). 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id.; CRIM. PROC. art. 493. 
 135 See LA. STAT. ANN. § § 14:42, 14:64 (2020) (defining aggravated rape and armed 
robbery, respectively); LA. CONST. art. I, § 17 (1974) (amended 1998, 2010, 2018); LA. CODE 
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 782 (1976). 
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contemplated by the new language of Article 493.136 On the case’s first 
hearing, the Louisiana Supreme Court agreed with the trial court and held 
that the trial court properly denied the motion to quash.137 
The Louisiana Supreme Court, on rehearing the case, specifically 
readdressed the issue of joining capital and noncapital offenses.138 The court 
walked through Louisiana’s historical joinder developments, from the pre-
Code standards to the newest joinder provision.139 Following the historical 
and interpretive discussion—a discussion that the court did not entertain in 
its original opinion—the court held in McZeal’s favor: Joinder of a capital 
offense with a noncapital offense constituted misjoinder under Article 493.140 
The Louisiana Supreme Court found that when the legislature 
constructed the new Article 493, it intended for courts to determine the 
“modes of trial” by the potential punishment associated with the offense.141 
Courts could find those different punishments, the court articulated, in the 
Louisiana constitution.142 The relevant constitutional provision articulated 
different jury size and concurrence requirements for different types of 
offenses and “suggest[ed] four classes of trials: trial before a judge only; trial 
before a jury of six persons . . . ; trial before a jury of twelve persons, ten of 
whom must concur . . . ; and trial before a jury of twelve persons, all of whom 
must concur . . . .”143 The State argued for, and the court contemplated, other 
potential “modes of trial” possibly imagined by the legislature, such as 
“classes of trials” based on the factfinder144 or based on the “number of triers 
of fact.”145 Despite these other potential interpretations, the court settled on 
four different “modes of trial” defined by their potential punishments. 
 
 136 McZeal, 352 So. 2d at 594. 
 137 Id. at 599. 
 138 Id. (Dennis, J. on rehearing). 
 139 Id. at 599–601. 
 140 Id. at 603. 
 141 Id. 
 142 Id.; LA. CONST. art. I, § 17 (1974) (amended 1998, 2010, 2018). 
 143 McZeal, 352 So. 2d at 601 (Dennis, J. on rehearing); LA. CONST. art. I, § 17 (1974) 
(amended 1998, 2010, 2018). 
 144 See McZeal, 352 So. 2d at 601 (Dennis, J. on rehearing). In this scenario, the court 
contemplated that one “class” would be a trial before a judge and the other “class” would be 
a trial before a jury. Id. 
 145 Id. This is the argument the State made in defense of permitting the joinder of offenses, 
although the court ultimately disagreed. Id. 
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The court ultimately reasoned that the language of new Article 493 was 
similar to the liberal Federal Rule 8(a),146 but by including the phrase “mode 
of trial,” the Louisiana legislature must have intended to codify the 
previously dominant jurisprudential rule, nodding to the court’s 
interpretation that could be traced all the way back to Hataway.147 The court 
reasoned that because four different “modes of trial” existed, and aggravated 
rape and armed robbery were subject to different punishments—as evidenced 
by their different jury concurrence requirements—joining the two offenses 
in McZeal’s case constituted misjoinder.148 Courts categorically could not 
join capital offenses and noncapital offenses in the same charging 
document.149 
B. LOUISIANA’S CURRENT JOINDER AND SEVERANCE REGIME 
The author contends that Article 493’s interpretation and the principle 
espoused by the Louisiana Supreme Court in McZeal are precedential today. 
The Louisiana Supreme Court, Louisiana’s lower courts, and federal courts 
have upheld the ruling that courts may not join capital and noncapital 
offenses under Article 493 or, at a minimum, have cited favorably to 
McZeal.150 
Louisiana’s primary joinder provision is Article 493, and its text has not 
changed since McZeal.151 The Article reads, in its entirety: 
Two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment or information in a 
separate count for each offense if the offenses charged, whether felonies or 
misdemeanors, are of the same or similar character or are based on the same act or 
transaction on two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts 
of a common scheme or plan; provided that the offenses joined by must be triable by 
the same mode of trial.152 
 
 146 See id. Further, the court discussed that while the methods used by the federal courts 
in applying Federal Rule 8(a) might guide their interpretation in other contexts, the express 
difference in language the Louisiana Legislature used must indicate that the legislature wanted 
to break from the Federal Rules liberal joinder regime. See id. 
 147 See id. at 600–01. 
 148 Id. at 602–03. 
 149 Id. at 603. 
 150 See, e.g., State v. Clarkson, 48 So. 3d 272, 273 (La. 2010); State v. Washington, 846 
So. 2d 723, 725–26 (La. 2003); State v. Strickland, 683 So. 2d 218, 224–25 (La. 1996); State 
v. Jones, 396 So. 2d 1272, 1274 (La. 1981); State v. Chapman, 367 So. 2d 808, 810–11 (La. 
1979); State v. Donahue, 355 So. 2d 247, 250 (La. 1978); State v. Proctor, 354 So. 2d 488, 
490 (La. 1977); State v. McElroy, 241 So. 3d 424, 428 (La. Ct. App. 2018); State v. Jones, 
888 So. 2d 885, 892 (La. Ct. App. 2004); State v. Adams, 525 So. 2d 1256, 1262 (La. Ct. App. 
1988); Manning v. Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary, 786 F.2d 710, 711 (5th Cir. 1986). 
 151 LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 493 (2020); McZeal, 352 So. 2d at 593–94. 
 152 CRIM. PROC. art. 493. 
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Although the Article shares many similarities with Federal Rule 8(a), 
and courts may even look to Rule 8(a)’s federal interpretation for guidance,153 
the differences between the two have sweeping consequences. The language 
primarily differs in two ways. 
First, Article 493 does not contain the phrase “or both” in the context of 
joining “felonies or misdemeanors,” whereas Federal Rule 8(a) contains 
“felonies or misdemeanors or both.”154 The McZeal Court noted this 
distinction.155 The exclusion of “or both” indicates an intent to prevent the 
joinder of the different types of offenses.156 
The second difference, as the McZeal Court discussed in depth, lies at 
the end of article 493: the phrase, “triable by the same mode of trial.”157 One 
commentator, writing just after the amendment and before McZeal, 
suggested that the legislature included this phrase to “avoid the state 
constitutional problems implicit in joinder of offenses triable by different 
kinds of juries,”158 as the language is similar to that used in the historical 
Hataway context.159 
Although Louisiana offers an additional misjoinder protection, the state 
also provides a method for severance of the offenses based on prejudice, just 
as every other jurisdiction does.160 Article 495.1—“Severance of 
Offenses”—gives parties a method to request that the judge determine 
whether the joinder of the offenses prejudices the party.161 A motion for 
severance under Article 495.1 is distinguishable from a party’s misjoinder 
argument. If a party argues misjoinder pretrial in a motion to quash, the judge 
 
 153 See McZeal, 352 So. 2d at 600–02 (Dennis, J. on rehearing). 
 154 Compare CRIM. PROC. art. 493, with FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(a). 
 155 See McZeal, 352 So. 2d at 602 (Dennis, J. on rehearing). 
 156 See id.; Kelly, supra note 38, at 215. 
 157 CRIM. PROC. art. 493. 
 158 Kelly, supra note 38, at 215. 
 159 See id. The Court in McZeal cited the commentator when discussing the legislature’s 
intent to reconcile the Louisiana Constitution with the new Article 493. McZeal, 352 So. 2d at 
599 (Dennis, J. on rehearing). 
 160 See Part II, supra. 
 161 CRIM. PROC. art. 495.1. The Article reads, in its entirety: “If it appears that a defendant 
or the state is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses in an indictment or bill of information or by 
such joinder for trial together, the court may order separate trials, grant a severance of offenses, 
or provide whatever other relief justice requires.” Id. Article 495.1 specifically authorizes a 
judge’s power to sever the offenses, which is different from a party objecting to the misjoinder 
of offenses. From a party’s severance argument, the judge discretionarily determines whether 
prejudice exists based on the proper joinder of offenses. Under Article 495.1, the defendant 
can move for severance after trial has begun and need not raise the issue in a motion to quash. 
See id. 
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will determine whether the joinder of the offenses is proper under Article 
493.162 
Many readers will be familiar with Louisiana’s relatively recent 
constitutional amendment requiring jury concurrence,163 mandating 
unanimous jury verdicts in felony cases in which the offense is necessarily 
punishable at hard labor.164 Although it is relieving to know that Louisiana 
finally requires unanimous jury verdicts for all of its offenses, one may 
ponder whether courts may now properly join capital and noncapital offenses 
under Article 493 because they have the same jury size and concurrence 
requirements for offenses committed after January 1, 2019.165 However, the 
constitutional amendment only altered the provisions governing these size 
and concurrence requirements; it did not alter Louisiana’s joinder provisions 
or reinterpret the “modes of trial” language.166 
The author contends that the crux of the McZeal decision distinguished 
the “modes of trial” by their punishments, not by their jury size and 
concurrence requirements. The previous jury size and concurrence 
requirements only evidenced the different punishments and “modes of trial.” 
Now, although there are fewer jury size and concurrence permutations, the 
four different punishments still remain. Therefore, the constitutional 
amendment did not affect the state’s joinder and severance regime. To avoid 
future confusion, the Louisiana legislature should reconcile its constitutional 
and statutory joinder provisions with the new constitutional amendment and 
retain the prohibition on joinder of capital and noncapital offenses. 
Although the McZeal court indicated that the four “modes of trial” were 
rigid, unmoving boundaries, the legislature later altered those boundaries 
slightly. Article 493.2—”Joinder of felonies; mode of trial”—allows courts 
to join two different types of felonies “[n]otwithstanding the provisions of 
 
 162 See CRIM. PROC. art. 495. 
 163 See generally LA. CONST. art. I, § 17 (amended 1998, 2010, 2018); 2019 La. Acts 364–
65. 
 164 See generally LA. CONST. art. I, § 17 (amended 1998, 2010, 2018); 2019 La. Acts 364–
65. Following the enactment of the constitutional amendment, all felony offenses in Louisiana 
require a unanimous jury of twelve to convict. Prior to 2019, juries for felony offenses 
necessarily punishable at hard labor only needed 10 of 12 jurors to convict, as opposed to 
capital offenses which require a unanimous jury of 12. See LA. CONST. art. I, § 17 (amended 
1998, 2010, 2018); 2019 La. Acts 364–65; AIELLO, supra note 95, at ix (noting in its preface 
that, at the time the book was written, felony convictions required only 10 of 12 jurors). 
 165 See CRIM. PROC. art. 782. 
 166 See LA. CONST. art. I, § 17; 2019 La. Acts 364–65; CRIM. PROC. art. 782. The 
constitutional amendment, and concurrent Code of Criminal Procedure amendment, did not 
address joinder—only jury concurrence requirements. See LA. CONST. art. I, § 17; 2019 La. 
Acts 364–65; CRIM. PROC. art. 782. 
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Article 493.”167 Under the Article, adopted in 1997,168 courts may join 
felonies in which punishment is necessarily confinement at hard labor—
requiring ten out of twelve jurors for a verdict at the time—with felonies in 
which punishment may be confinement at hard labor—requiring six out of 
six jurors for a verdict at the time.169 The Article intended to define the jury 
size and concurrence for joinder of these different offenses. Such cases, the 
Article continues, “shall be tried by a jury composed of twelve jurors, ten of 
whom must concur to render a verdict.”170 
Even with additional joinder provisions and an unfortunate criminal 
jury-size history, the author contends that McZeal’s main thrust remains: 
courts may not join capital and noncapital offenses. Any attempt to do so 
constitutes statutory misjoinder. In this particular criminal context, 
Louisiana’s joinder provisions value the prevention of prejudice in a 
defendant’s case over judicial efficiency—more so than other U.S. 
jurisdictions.171 
Of course, one must remember that Louisiana may impose the death 
penalty for capital offenses.172 Louisiana defendants facing that severe 
potential consequence, however, receive a structural protection in misjoinder 
that no other jurisdiction in the country gives. In every criminal jurisdiction 
 
 167 CRIM. PROC. art. 493.2. 
 168 1997 La. Acts 902. 
 169 See CRIM. PROC. art. 493.2. 
 170 Id. Following Ramos v. Louisiana, the provision is likely unconstitutional. See Ramos 
v. Louisiana, 140 S.Ct. 1390, 1397 (2020). 
 171 Make no mistake, in most historical criminal contexts, Louisiana has rightfully been 
called out by the public and federal courts for its wrong and horrible practices. See, e.g., 
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968); Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 138–39 
(1979); Selman v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 906, 906 (1976); Williams v. Edwards, 547 F.2d 1208, 
1218–19 (5th Cir. 1977); Wilbert Rideau & Billy Sinclair, Prisoner Litigation: How it Began 
in Louisiana, 45 LA. L. REV. 1060 (1985); William Quigley, Louisiana Angola Penitentiary: 
Past Time to Close, 163 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 203 (2018); Courtney Harper Turkington, 
Louisiana’s Addiction to Mass Incarceration by the Numbers, 63 LOY. L. REV. 557 (2017); 
Monica L. Bergeron, Comment, Second Place Isn’t Good Enough: Achieving True Reform 
Through Expanded Parole Eligibility, 80 LA. L. REV. 109 (2019); Richard A. Oppel Jr. & 
Jugal K. Patel, One Lawyer, 194 Felony Cases, and No Time, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2019, 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/01/31/us/public-defender-case-loads.html 
[https://perma.cc/FEP6-STP8]; Lea Skene, Louisiana once again has nation’s highest 
imprisonment rate after Oklahoma briefly rose to top, THE ADVOCATE, Dec. 25, 2019, 2:02 
PM, https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/article_4dcdfe1c-213a-11ea-8314-
933ce786be2c.html [https://perma.cc/3Z5Y-SD45]. The state has been in the criminal law 
spotlight before, for all of the wrong reasons. But, in this limited joinder instance, other 
jurisdictions can learn from Louisiana to better protect their capital defendants. 
 172 See, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:30 (2020) (indicating that the district attorney may seek 
a capital verdict in charge of first-degree murder). 
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in the United States except for Louisiana, courts may properly join capital 
offenses with any other offense—even an offense as small as a 
misdemeanor.173 Defendants in jurisdictions that may impose the death 
penalty thus receive one fewer potential procedural safeguard, one that may 
have profound effects on their trials. 
In the United States today, twenty-six jurisdictions permit a death 
sentence,174 and thus, because of their liberal joinder regimes, many of them 
may impose a death penalty for one offense joined with and tried alongside 
another offense, even if the second offense bears a much lower potential 
punishment.175 In three states, the legislatures codified capital punishment, 
but the states imposed moratoriums on such sentences.176 Finally, there are 
twenty-two jurisdictions that have abolished the death penalty.177 
Even still, in capital jurisdictions, courts can generally still join those 
offenses that may receive a death penalty sentence with noncapital offenses. 
But this possibility is one less concern for Louisiana criminal defendants 
facing trial for a capital offense. Louisiana’s joinder provision offers 
defendants a shield other states do not afford their defendants. Other U.S. 
jurisdictions, especially those that permit the death penalty, should take heed 
and commit themselves to giving capital defendants a similar misjoinder 
procedural safeguard. 
IV. IMPROVING CAPITAL-OFFENSE JOINDER AND SEVERANCE 
One can see the practical difference between Louisiana’s joinder regime 
and the rest of the United States, but there are other analytical, proactive, and 
historical considerations for jurisdictions to contemplate when deciding 
whether to amend their existing joinder regimes. 
 
 173 See supra Parts I–II. 
 174 Those jurisdictions that, at a minimum, have the statutory authority to use the death 
penalty are: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Wyoming, 
and the federal courts. See infra Appendix, C.1. 
 175 See supra Parts I–II. 
 176 Those three states with moratoriums are: California, Montana, and Oregon. See infra 
Appendix, C.2. 
 177 The 2 jurisdictions that have abolished the death penalty are: Alaska, Colorado, 
Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, 
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, 
Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See infra Appendix C.3. 
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A. ARGUMENTS FOR LIBERAL JOINDER REGIMES 
The arguments for liberal joinder, which have dominated the joinder 
discussion for decades, often hold that joinder promotes efficiency, judicial 
economy, and convenience.178 In Bruton v. United States, the Supreme Court 
found that “[j]oint trials do conserve state funds, diminish inconvenience to 
witness and public authorities, and avoid delays in bringing those accused of 
crime to trial.”179 The Ninth Circuit said that there is a “substantial public 
interest in [joinder].”180 If courts can join offenses, the parties, judges, jurors, 
witnesses, and courts as a whole can save valuable time and money.181 
Additionally, many jurisdictions already have overloaded criminal dockets, 
creating more of a need for expeditious adjudication and a desire to cut down 
on the number of trials a court must hold. 
The prosecution arguably benefits the most from joinder of offenses.182 
When the prosecution can consolidate evidence of multiple offenses into one 
trial, “the jury may develop a fuller picture of the defendant’s criminality,” 
and thus the presentation has a “synergistic impact” on the jury’s 
determination of guilt.183 
 
 178 See generally, e.g., Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 209 (1987); Zafiro v. U.S., 506 
U.S. 534, 537 (1993); Bruton v. U.S., 391 U.S. 123, 143 (1968); Opper v. U.S., 348 U.S. 84, 
95 (1954); U.S. v. Bryan, 843 F.2d 1339, 1342 (11th Cir. 1988); U.S. v. Eufrasio, 935 F.2d 
553, 568 (3d Cir. 1991); U.S. v. Werner, 620 F.2d 922, 928 (2d Cir. 1980); U.S. v. Butler, 822 
F.2d 1191, 1194 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Parker v. U.S., 404 F.2d 1193, 1196 (9th Cir. 1968). 
 179 Bruton, 391 U.S. at 143. 
 180 Parker, 404 F.2d at 1196. The court, at the time, spoke directly to joinder of 
defendants, not necessarily joinder of offenses, although one could find that the argument 
would remain the same. See id. 
 181 Hein, supra note 37, at 1144. Some commentators suggest that the time and money 
savings stem from not needing to seat more than one jury. See Bordens & Horowitz, supra 
note 37, at 340. Others, however, suggest that the time associated with empaneling another 
jury is not substantial. See Note, Joint and Single Trials Under Rules 8 and 14 of the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, supra note 37, at 560 (stating in comparing whether the 
prosecution would need to present the background at two trials, “[t]he time spent where similar 
offenses are joined may not be as long as two trials but the time saved by impaneling only one 
jury and by setting the defendant’s background only once seems minimal.”) (emphasis added). 
 182 Hein, supra note 37, at 1144. 
 183 7 GARY KATZMANN, INSIDE THE CRIMINAL PROCESS 193 (1991). The full quote from 
Katzmann is: 
From the government’s perspective, prosecuting multiple counts against a defendant 
in a single trial, as compared with separate trials, generally has strategic advantages. 
For one thing, when the government presents evidence relating to a number of 
accusations, the jury may develop a fuller picture of the defendant’s criminality. 
Perhaps more important, counts which may be weak or ‘thin’ when tried singly and 
by themselves may assume greater authority when tried together. In one trial, each 
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But the defendant can benefit from joinder of offenses as well. A 
defendant may rather only go through the emotional toll and time of one trial, 
“and joinder may also enable the court system to dispose of the case more 
swiftly.”184 Additionally, depending on the jurisdiction’s sentencing rules, 
joinder may allow the defendant to receive concurrent sentences rather than 
consecutive ones and thus spend less time in prison.185 
There are, of course, arguments against the judicial efficiency 
arguments promoting liberal joinder regimes. For instance, the mere act of 
joinder of offenses may prejudice a defendant because the jury may assume 
that because the state charged her with several offenses in the same charging 
document, she must be guilty of at least one of the offenses.186 Further, the 
jury may conflate the evidence for each offense when choosing to convict the 
defendant of fewer than all of the offenses.187 In addition, joinder may force 
the defendant to present inconsistent defenses to the separate offenses during 
the same trial.188 
B. RESEARCH RAISING CONCERNS WITH LIBERAL JOINDER REGIMES 
These rational arguments against judicial efficiency only scratch the 
surface. Several scholars, conducting legal, psychological, and behavioral 
science research suggest that joinder may have unintended negative impacts 
on juries’ considerations and defendants’ convictions. 
1. From the Late 20th Century 
During the 1970s and 1980s, researchers and scholars published a string 
of studies on joinder’s effects on jurors’ reactions.189 Although there was no 
 
count may serve to buttress the other. Although the judge may instruct the jury to 
consider each count on its own merits, prosecutors and defense attorneys agree that 
joinder of counts has a synergistic impact. 
Id. 
 184 Hein, supra note 37, at 1145; Farrin, supra note 37, at 327. 
 185 Hein, supra note 37, at 1145. 
 186 See Kelly, supra note 38, at 204 n.8; Slovenko, supra note 125, at 71. Commentators 
argued this point even before the Federal Rules were adopted. See Maguire, Proposed New 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 23 OR. L. REV. 56, 58–59 (1943) (“We all know that, 
if you can pile up a number of charges against a man, it is quite often the case that the jury 
will convict, where, if they were listening to the evidence on one charge only, they would find 
it wholly insufficient.”). 
 187 See Kelly, supra note 38, at 204 n.8; Slovenko, supra note 125, at 71. 
 188 See Kelly, supra note 38, at 204 n.9; Slovenko, supra note 125, at 71. 
 189 See, e.g., Norbert L. Kerr & Gary W. Sawyers, Independence of Multiple Verdicts 
Within a Trial by Mock Jurors, 10 REPRESENTATIVE RSCH. SOC. PSYCH. 16 (1979); Irwin A. 
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consensus among the studies, each revolved its discussion around similar 
threads. 
For instance, one of the studies found evidence of jury confusion in 
joined offense trials: the compounded evidence confused their test jury, 
causing jurors to remember the evidence incorrectly.190 The study found a 
causal link between the jury confusion and biased verdicts against the 
defendant.191 
Although one cannot read these twentieth century studies as a whole to 
conclude that evidence exists for jurors’ incorrect accumulation of the 
evidence,192 some of those studies did find strong support for the theory that 
a jury would infer a defendant’s criminality based merely on having joined 
 
Horowitz, Kenneth S. Bordens, Marc S. Feldman, A Comparison of Verdicts Obtained in 
Severed and Joined Criminal Trials, 10 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 444 (1980); Sarah Tanford & 
Steven Penrod, Biases in Trials Involving Defendants Charged with Multiple Offenses, 12 J. 
APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 453 (1982) [hereinafter Tanford & Penrod, Biases in Trials]; Kenneth 
S. Bordens & Irwin A. Horowitz, Information Processing in Joined and Severed Trials, 13 J. 
APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 351 (1983); Sarah Tanford & Steven Penrod, Social Inference Processes 
in Juror Judgments of Multiple-Offense Trials, 47 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 749 (1984) 
[hereinafter Tanford & Penrod, Social Inference Processes]; Edith Greene & Elizabeth F. 
Loftus, When Crimes are Joined at Trial, 9 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 193 (1985); Sarah Tanford, 
Steven Penrod & Rebecca Collins, Decision Making in Joined Criminal Trials: The Influence 
of Charge Similarity, Evidence Similarity, and Limiting Instructions, 9 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 319 
(1985). 
 190 Bordens & Horowitz, supra note 189, at 368–69. 
 191 Id. Some of the other studies, however, did not come to such a firm conclusion. Three 
of the studies did find evidence of jury confusion related to the facts, but concluded that the 
jury confusion did not lead to biased verdicts. See Tanford & Penrod, Biases in Trials, supra 
note 189; Tanford & Penrod, Social Inference Processes, supra note 189; Tanford, Penrod & 
Collins, supra note 189. One pair of researchers, Greene & Loftus, despite not finding 
evidence of jury confusion, still attempted to hypothesize as to why it might exist. See Greene 
& Loftus, supra note 189, at 193–94. The pair hypothesized that jurors’ memories may 
overload from the sheer number of facts, such that all of the facts are difficult to remember; 
jurors may mix information from different sources or relative to other offenses; or jurors may 
only remember discerning relevant, pejorative information, which confirms their verdict. See 
id. As one commentator notes, however, Greene and Loftus’s lack of findings for significant 
jury confusion, “may be attributable to the relative lack of evidence” that they used in their 
study. Farrin, supra note 37, at 329. Further, the commentator notes that the conclusions 
reached on juror confusion not leading to biased verdicts were not supported “by research 
showing that memory of particular facts does not correlate strongly with general impressions,” 
and that “future research into the exact nature of juror memory errors,” would be helpful to 
understand the differences in results of those studies. Id. 
 192 See Farrin, supra note 37, at 329. That is, where a jury would merge the evidence of 
the multiple offenses in their mind, even though evidence of the separate offenses should be 
kept separate. 
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offenses at the trial.193 The theory flows from a juror’s potential belief that 
because a defendant has one negative trait, she must have other negative 
traits. One pair of researchers even proposed a “path model” outlining the 
process through which the juries’ inferences about the defendant made their 
way into sentencing.194 Additionally, two studies found that joinder’s effect 
on the ultimate convictions was greater when the cases against the defendant 
were weak.195 
The studies reached different conclusions in some aspects and had 
methodological differences, yet they agreed that criminal defendants may 
face a greater likelihood of conviction when courts try the charged offenses 
jointly rather than separately.196 One commentator, discussing the research, 
said that “[t]he empirical data unequivocally show that the probability of a 
defendant being convicted significantly increases if offenses are joined rather 
than tried separately.”197 In addition, this conviction effect increases when 
there are more offenses charged and joined together.198 To correct these 
biases in real courtrooms, the solution “might well be a less frequent and 
more circumspect use of joinder.”199 Jurisdictions could take a more prudent, 
limited approach to joinder without affecting a large number of criminal 
cases by restricting the joinder of capital offenses with noncapital offenses. 
2. Leipold and Abbasi 
Andrew D. Leipold and Hossein A. Abbasi conducted the next 
substantial analysis of joinder in 2006, examining the frequency of joinder 
and convictions in federal criminal cases.200 They sought to determine the 
level and effect of prejudice in cases in which joinder applies.201 During the 
 
 193 See Bordens & Horowitz, supra note 189, at 368; Tanford & Penrod, Biases in Trials, 
supra note 189, at 477; Tanford & Penrod, Social Inference, supra note 189, at 762–63; 
Greene & Loftus, supra note 189, at 204–05; Tanford, Penrod & Collins, supra note 189, at 
334. 
 194 Tanford & Penrod, Social Inference Processes, supra note 189 at 760, 763. 
 195 See Kerr & Sawyers, supra note 189, at 25–26; Tanford, Penrod & Collins, supra note 
189, at 332–33. 
 196 See Kerr & Sawyers, supra note 189, at 25–26; Bordens, Horowitz & Feldman, supra 
note 189, at 453–54; Tanford & Penrod, Biases in Trials, supra note 189, at 475; Bordens & 
Horowitz, supra note 189; Tanford & Penrod, Social Inference Processes, supra note 189; 
Greene & Loftus, supra note 189, at 204–05; Tanford, Penrod & Collins, supra note 189, at 
332–33. 
 197 Farrin, supra note 37, at 332. 
 198 Id. at 330–31. 
 199 Id. at 332. 
 200 Leipold & Abbasi, supra note 19. 
 201 Id. 
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five-year period of their study, more than half of the federal defendants’ 
charges invoked joinder.202 Leipold and Abbasi found, just as the late-
twentieth century group of research determined, that when defendants face 
multiple counts in a trial, the conviction rate for the more heavily-sentenced 
charge against the defendant increased dramatically—from 68% for 
defendants with a single count to 82% for defendants with a second count.203 
More drastically, if courts joined a third charge, the conviction rate for the 
more serious charge rose again, this time to 88%.204 
Although the joinder research from the late-twentieth century did not 
conclude that juries would incorrectly accumulate evidence between the 
charged offense, Leipold and Abbasi did find evidence of such behavior.205 
The two further suggest that this inference is more likely to occur when the 
joinder is based on counts of the “same or similar character” that are not a 
part of a “common plan or scheme,” allowing joinder of the offenses based 
on their nature as opposed to their temporal or factual connection.206 
In one sense, the lack of research and agreement does not show a 
definitive conclusion of prejudice to defendants. Further, the focus on federal 
criminal defendants leaves gaps in understanding potential prejudices of 
criminal defendants in state courts. 
Despite the lack of consensus regarding some potential prejudice to 
defendants, these studies show that the mere fact that courts join offenses in 
a defendant’s case can lead to a greater chance that a jury will convict her.207 
Jurisdictions should monitor this research and acknowledge that capital 
defendants face the gravest consequences if convicted due to bias or 
prejudice—and thus courts should not subject defendants to a potentially 
biased conviction purely because the prosecution joined their capital offense 
with another offense merely for efficiency. Alternatively, jurisdictions 
should acknowledge that legal scholars should conduct additional research 
on the potential biases of criminal defendants to better determine how to 
revise their joinder regimes. 
 
 202 Id. at 350–51. Leipold and Abbasi do note that this large number cannot determine “the 
status of defendants who actually went to trial.” Id. at 365. 
 203 Id. at 367. 
 204 Id. 
 205 Id. 
 206 See id. at 355–56, 398 n.140. 
 207 See Kerr & Sawyers, supra note 189, at 25–26; Bordens, Horowitz & Feldman, supra 
note 189, at 453–54; Tanford & Penrod, Biases in Trials, supra note 189, at 475; Bordens & 
Horowitz, supra note 189; Tanford & Penrod, Social Inference Processes, supra note 189; 
Greene & Loftus, supra note 189, at 204–05; Tanford, Penrod & Collins, supra note 189, at 
332; Leipold & Abbasi, supra note 19; MOORE, supra note 36, ¶ 8.02[1]. 
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C. JURISDICTIONS ALREADY TREATING CAPITAL OFFENSES 
DIFFERENTLY 
For decades, courts have repeated variations of the same adage: 
“[D]eath is different.”208 U.S. jurisdictions already treat capital offense 
procedure differently by giving more institutional protections to capital 
defendants in contexts other than joinder and severance. Further, preparation 
by capital-defendant representatives is already complex;209 prohibiting the 
joinder of capital offenses with noncapital offenses would simplify already 
intricate cases. Jurisdictions, therefore, are well-situated to consider an 
additional protection for capital defendants. 
For instance, many states require attorneys to meet certain qualifications 
if they wish to represent a defendant either during a capital trial or during 
post-conviction proceedings.210 In addition, many jurisdictions have 
heightened standards capital defendants must meet if they wish to waive their 
right to counsel, waive their right to a jury trial, or plead guilty.211 Many states 
have separate provisions to govern capital trials.212 These are just some 
examples; most capital jurisdictions have additional provisions that apply to 
defendants charged with a capital crime.213 
In Louisiana, the McZeal court discussed how Louisiana already treated 
capital defendants differently in other procedural contexts,214 many of which 
 
 208 See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 45–46 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“It is 
in capital cases especially that the balance of conflicting interests must be weighed most 
heavily in favor of the procedural safeguards of the Bill of Rights.”); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 
U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (“[T]he penalty of death is different in kind from any other punishment 
imposed under our system of criminal justice.”); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 
305 (1976) (noting that a death sentence is “qualitatively different from a sentence of 
imprisonment, however long”); State v. Neveaux, 285 So. 3d 1089, 1090 (La. 2019) (Johnson, 
C.J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
 209 See, e.g., McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 855 (1994); AM. BAR ASS’N, GUIDELINES 
FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES 
(rev. ed. 2003). 
 210 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-54 (2019); ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37.5(c) (2019); TEX. CODE 
CRIM. P. art. 26.052 (2019); VA. CODE CRIM. P. § 19.2-163.7 (2019). 
 211 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-42 (2020); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 135.045, 138.504 (2019) 
(allowing the court to refuse a defendant’s waive or counsel if the defendant is charged with 
a capital offense); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 1.13, 1.14, 11.071 (2020) (governing 
waiver of trial by jury). 
 212 See, e.g., ALA. CRIM. CODE § 13A-5-43 (2020); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-264.2–19.2-
264.5 (2020). 
 213 For instance, some states offer additional peremptory challenges to parties when the 
defendant is charged with a capital offense. See, e.g., OHIO R. CRIM. P. 24(D) (giving parties 
six instead of four peremptory challenges); OR. REV. STAT. § 136.230 (2019) (giving parties 
12 peremptory challenges instead of six or three). 
 214 State v. McZeal, 352 So. 2d 592, 602 n.8 (La. 1977) (Dennis, J. on rehearing). 
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are similar to the additional procedures for capital punishment cases in other 
jurisdictions. Although the court focused on the different “classes” of trials 
described by the Louisiana constitution and joinder provision as the basis for 
why courts could not join capital offenses with noncapital offenses, the court 
mentioned many instances where Louisiana law treats cases involving capital 
offenses differently, adding to their justification that the legislature intended 
the more restrictive joinder regime.215 For instance, as the McZeal court 
pointed out, Louisiana law requires that the prosecution of a capital case 
commence by indictment, rather than a bill of information.216 Appointed 
counsel in Louisiana capital cases must be admitted to the state bar for at 
least five years.217 A Louisiana court may not accept a defendant’s 
unqualified guilty plea in a capital case.218 In capital cases, the court must 
sequester the jury.219 All of these are examples, the court reasoned, of the law 
giving statutory protections because of the high-stakes nature of a capital 
case.220 These provisions show a structural, institutional care for a capital 
defendant—cares that courts do not extend to defendants in noncapital cases. 
Other jurisdictions should acknowledge that they already treat capital 
defendants differently than noncapital defendants in other contexts and 
should adopt one additional procedural provision related to the prosecution 
of capital cases: courts may not join capital offenses with noncapital offenses 
in preparation for trial. 
D. COMBATTING PLEA BARGAINING AND TRIAL PENALTY CONCERNS 
Today’s defendants, however, face a criminal justice system that “is for 
the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.”221 Data suggest that 
less than 3% of federal defendants, and possibly even fewer in state courts, 
actually go to trial.222 Thus, many defendants facing capital offenses might 
seek to negotiate a plea, rather than proceed to trial. 
 
 215 Id. 
 216 LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 382 (2020). 
 217 Id. art. 512. 
 218 Id. art. 557. 
 219 Id. art. 791. 
 220 See generally McZeal, 352 So. 2d at 602 n.8. 
 221 Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170 (2012). 
 222 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES FISCAL YEAR 
2015, at 4 (2016), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/resea
rch-publications/2016/FY15_Overview_Federal_Criminal_Cases.pdf [https://perma.cc/42K3
-ARQM]; Jed S. Rakoff, Why Prosecutors Rule the Criminal Justice System—and What Can 
Be Done About It, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1429, 1432 (2017). 
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When courts join multiple offenses, however, the odds of “charge 
piling” during a plea negotiation increase.223 If prosecutors use “charge 
piling” or other coercive bargaining measures, then a criminal defendant 
entering a plea agreement may suffer based on the charged offenses and 
corresponding sentences.224 Joining a capital offense with a noncapital 
offense might most exacerbate these concerns for defendants.225 Further, if a 
defendant does elect to proceed to trial, and the jury convicts her of the joined 
noncapital offense,226 she will most likely face a “trial penalty” for choosing 
to take her case to trial, leading to a larger sentence.227 
Prohibiting the joinder of capital and noncapital offenses might alleviate 
some of the rising concerns regarding power imbalances in plea bargaining 
and trial penalties in sentencing. Jurisdictions could prevent prosecutors from 
using these potentially impactful prosecutorial tactics in defendants’ cases 
where decisions about whether to proceed to trial or negotiate a plea deal may 
mean life or death. 
E. IRRELEVANCE OF ACTUAL DEATH PENALTY USE 
All jurisdictions—not just those with the death penalty—can learn from 
and subscribe to the idea that courts should restrict joinder of those offenses 
that are given the highest potential sentence with those offenses with a less 
severe sentence. It should not matter whether a jurisdiction uses the death 
penalty for its highest-level offenses for that jurisdiction to consider 
protecting those defendants facing the most severe punishment the 
jurisdiction is willing to administer. 
In McZeal, the Louisiana Supreme Court dealt with a similar issue.228 
In between McZeal’s conviction and the Court rehearing the case, the U.S. 
Supreme Court invalidated the use of the death penalty for Louisiana’s 
 
 223 See Crespo, supra note 37, at 1316–23; NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIM. DEF. LAWS., THE TRIAL 
PENALTY: THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO TRIAL ON THE VERGE OF EXTINCTION AND HOW 
TO SAVE IT 24–32 (2018), https://www.nacdl.org/getattachment/95b7f0f5-90df-4f9f-9115-
520b3f58036a/the-trial-penalty-the-sixth-amendment-right-to-trial-on-the-verge-of-
extinction-and-how-to-save-it.pdf [https://perma.cc/XH6B-KB3B]. 
 224 See Crespo, supra note 37, at 1316–23, see also NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIM. DEF. LAWS., 
supra note 223. 
 225 For instance, see generally Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of 
Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2464, 2519 (2004) (discussing how prosecutors may use initially 
charged high offenses to make defendants “more likely to think that they are getting good 
deals when they are offered lower sentences”). 
 226 Or, if they are convicted of the capital offense, but the sentence is a prison sentence 
rather than a death sentence. 
 227 See, e.g., NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWS., supra note 224, at 5. 
 228 See State v. McZeal, 352 So. 2d 592, 603–04 (La. 1977) (Dennis, J. on rehearing). 
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aggravated rape offense,229 McZeal’s capital offense.230 Thus, at the time of 
the rehearing, the State argued that both offenses the prosecution charged 
McZeal with would have belonged in the same “class” of trial and could be 
classified as felonies necessarily punishable at hard labor because the death 
penalty could not be used for either.231 The State argued that the misjoinder 
constituted harmless error, and that the defendant “can hardly complain of 
what turned out to be the routine joinder” of two offenses that—had the 
prosecution begun later—would have been rightfully joined under the court’s 
interpretation of Article 493.232 
The court disagreed with the State and held that this constituted 
“misjoinder,” rather than a situation giving rise to discretionary review of 
joinder, because the offenses were not triable by the same “mode of trial.”233 
Finding misjoinder was important because it meant that the joinder was 
“conclusively presumed to be prejudicial or harmful,” and that the trial judge 
would have “no discretion to deny relief.”234 Although the court would not 
have actually instituted the death penalty in the case, the joining of the 
offenses constituted statutory misjoinder, such that review was forbidden. 
And because of the misjoinder, the prosecution was improper from the 
outset.235 Thus, the court did not find that misjoinder existed solely because 
the defendant would have received the death penalty under the original 
sentence of the crime. Rather, the court guarded its interpretation of Article 
493 and the structural differences in the “classes” of trials. 
The “classes” of trials differ based on their punishments, but whether 
Louisiana used the death penalty for its most severe crimes is not relevant. 
Under McZeal, it only matters that the punishments and “classes” differed. 
According to this rationale, the McZeal court would have come to the same 
conclusion even if Louisiana did not institute the death penalty for its “capital 
offenses.”236 
 
 229 See Selman v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 906, 906 (1976). 
 230 See McZeal, 352 So. 2d at 604–05. 
 231 Id. at 601. 
 232 Id. at 603. 
 233 Id. at 603–04. 
 234 Id. at 603. 
 235 Id. at 603–04. 
 236 But see State v. Clarkson, 48 So. 3d 272, 273 (La. 2010). In Clarkson, the Louisiana 
Supreme Court vacated a decision that non-capital offenses joined with a first-degree murder 
charge had prescribed. See id. The prosecution charged the defendant with “a capital charge 
of first-degree murder with five other counts charging non-capital felonies.” Id. The defendant 
did not move to quash the indictment on grounds of misjoinder, and the prosecution later 
forewent capital punishment for the first-degree murder charge. Id. The court held that, 
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Other jurisdictions should develop a similar dedication to their joinder 
regimes and their classifications of criminal offenses. Even where states 
abolish the death penalty or place a moratorium on its use, states can protect 
those defendants charged with their highest classified offenses. Just because 
a state does not use the death penalty does not mean that it has eliminated the 
potential biases against a defendant when the courts join its most serious 
offense with its least.237 
F. JURISPRUDENTIAL ROOTS IN JOINDER CONCERNS 
Despite a recent influx of liberal joinder arguments in cases, American 
jurisprudence has historical roots in more restrictive joinder regimes and in 
complete nonjoinder. There are many instances where a federal judge favored 
a more restrictive joinder regime. 
Prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules in 1946, the Supreme Court 
discussed prejudicial joinder in Pointer v. United States.238 The Court said 
that it was impermissible for a defendant to be “embarrassed” in the defense 
of her trial because of the multiple charges,239 and that an indictment should 
typically not contain more than one charge.240 Not long after Pointer, in 
McElroy v. United States, the Court spoke to the history of joinder in England 
and the United States: “[I]t is the settled rule in England and in many of our 
states to confine the indictment to one distinct offense, or restrict the evidence 
to one transaction.”241 
There are other notable examples of federal judges indicating a 
penchant for restrictive joinder. As Learned Hand once wrote: 
 
because capital punishment was no longer sought, all of the offenses were now non-capital 
felonies and properly joined under Louisiana’s joinder regime. Id. Further, the court held that 
none of the offenses had prescribed because the first-degree murder charge had begun as a 
capital case, which held a longer prescriptive period, and the “offense charged shall determine 
the applicable limitation.” Id. Clarkson, however, does not go as far as permitting the joinder 
of capital offenses with non-capital offenses. The court only found the joinder permissible 
because the prosecution changed the punishment it sought to a less severe one and the 
defendant failed to move to quash. Louisiana law provided a method by which the punishment 
for first-degree murder could transition from the death penalty to life imprisonment depending 
on what punishment the prosecution sought. See LA. STAT. ANN § 14:30(C)(2) (2007) 
(amended 2009); see also Clarkson, 48 So. 3d at 273 (citing § 14:30(C)(2)). In McZeal, the 
prosecution sought the death penalty throughout for the aggravated rape charge, and the death 
penalty was only prohibited by Selman. See State v. McZeal, 352 So. 2d 592, 603 (La. 1977). 
 237 See supra Parts I–II, V.B. 
 238 Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 400–04 (1894). 
 239 Id. at 403. 
 240 Id. 
 241 McElroy v. United States, 164 U.S. 76, 79–80 (1896). 
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There is indeed always a danger when several crimes are tried together, that 
the jury may use the evidence cumulatively; that is, that, although so much as would 
be admissible upon any one of the charges might not have persuaded them of the 
accused’s guilt, the sum of it will convince them as to all. This possibility violates 
the doctrine that only direct evidence of the transaction charged will ordinarily be 
accepted, and that the accused is not to be convicted because of his criminal 
disposition. Yet in the ordinary affairs of life such a disposition is a convincing 
factor, and its exclusion is rather because the issue is practically unmanageable than 
because it is not rationally relevant.242 
In 1964, the D.C. Circuit analyzed Judge Hand’s caution and expanded 
upon it by stating that “the possibility of the jury’s becoming hostile or 
inferring guilt from belief as to criminal disposition is just as substantial. For 
this reason great care must be exercised to protect the defendant from this 
possibility when joinder is tolerated under this theory.”243 
Further, some courts have discussed the arguments against liberal 
joinder regimes, such as those discussed by the social science research of 
potential juror bias previously addressed.244 In one such case, Gregory v. 
United States, the Court reversed a conviction, noting that the lower court 
should have granted the defendant’s motion for severance for prejudicial 
joinder of the offenses under Federal Rule 14.245 The Court, in this ruling, 
said that “there was not only the danger of the evidence with respect to the 
two robberies cumulating in the jurors’ minds tending to prove the defendant 
guilty of each, but the evidence as to one of the robberies was so weak as to 
lead one to question its sufficiency to go to the jury.”246 The Court believed 
that “[the weak evidence’s] primary usefulness in this trial was to support the 
Government’s case as to the robbery which resulted in the murder.”247 The 
Court invoked the same concern that Leipold and Abbasi raised fifty years 
later: that the jury may have improperly accumulated the evidence.248 
Even though these limited instances where a judge contemplated the 
dangers of liberal joinder may be insignificant compared to the reach of 
 
 242 United States v. Lotsch, 102 F.2d 35, 36 (2d Cir. 1939). 
 243 Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 85, 91 (D.C. Cir. 1964). The D.C. Circuit has argued 
that liberal joinder is problematic on multiple occasions. See also Kidwell v. United States, 38 
App. D.C. 566, 570 (1912); Gregory v. United States, 369 F.2d 185, 189 (D.C. Cir. 1966); 
United States v. Carter, 475 F.2d 349, 350–51 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
 244 See Gregory, 369 F.2d 185; Carter, 475 F.2d at 351. 
 245 Gregory, 369 F.2d at 189. 
 246 Id. 
 247 Id. 
 248 Leipold & Abbasi, supra note 19, at 355–59. 
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liberal joinder and severance regimes, they indicate a historical affirmation 
to stand upon when jurisdictions consider revising their joinder provisions. 
G. COURTS SHOULD OFFER STRUCTURAL PROTECTION, NOT 
DISCRETIONARY REVIEW 
One could argue, though, that there is no need for a statutory or 
otherwise institutional protection for criminal defendants because a 
protection already exists: the judge’s discretion to sever prejudicially joined 
offenses. If the defendant were truly prejudiced by the joining of a capital 
offense with a noncapital offense, then a judge would order the offenses 
severed and tried separately. Such an argument stands on historical ground, 
as that is the way that many jurisdictions in the United States have long 
operated. 
In the context of Federal Rules 8 and 14, in which joining capital 
offenses with noncapital offenses does not constitute misjoinder, a 
defendant’s only option to contest the joinder is to argue for permissive 
severance under Rule 14.249 After a defendant requests severance, a judge, 
depending on the jurisdiction, often exercises her discretion to balance the 
possibility of prejudice with the desire for judicial efficiency. Judicial 
economy is typically given greater weight, such that one federal court has 
said that the defendant may need to show that the joinder was “manifestly 
prejudicial.”250 Indeed, many jurisdictions have a similarly high threshold to 
prove the necessary prejudice for severance of the offenses.251 
If one party seeks to sever the charges, that party bears the burden to 
prove the existence of prejudice.252 Thus, most often, it is the defendant who 
bears the burden. An instance where prejudice under Rule 14 may arise to 
the requisite level is where the defendant has separate defenses for each of 
multiple charged offenses.253 Proving that prejudice exists at the trial level, 
 
 249 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 14(a). 
 250 United States v. Armstrong, 621 F.2d 951, 954 (9th Cir. 1980). Although the 
Armstrong court made this remark when discussing the joinder of defendants, because of the 
lack of jurisprudential attention to joinder of offenses, one may assume that the same, high 
standard would apply if a defendant asked for a severance of offenses. 
 251 See infra Appendix B. 
 252 See, e.g., United States v. LiCausi, 167 F.3d 36, 48 (1st Cir. 1999). 
 253 See, e.g., Cross v. United States, 335 F.2d 987, 989 (D.C. Cir. 1964). 
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however, can be difficult.254 Further, overturning denial of a motion to sever 
on appeal is even more daunting.255 
Courts and commentators alike have noted this potential difficulty. As 
one court stated, “‘[t]he burden of demonstrating prejudice is a difficult one, 
and the ruling of the trial judge will rarely be disturbed on review.’ The 
defendant must show something more than the fact that ‘a separate trial might 
offer him a better chance of acquittal.’”256 One criminal procedure 
commentator suggested that the decisions surrounding joinder are often left 
“to the unguided and largely unreviewable discretion of the trial judge.”257 
Another commentator advised that “relief from misjoinder is sometimes a 
matter of discretion, instead of a matter of right,” and that, “[t]hus, a 
prosecutor’s initial matter of framing the indictment is likely to be the way 
in which [a defendant] go[es] to trial.”258 Thus, because a severance grant is 
so difficult to acquire, the “protection” against prejudice is rarely useful. 
In effect, because courts often may not grant severance, the prosecution 
can routinely use joinder and force defendants to combat whatever offenses 
the prosecution chooses to join. A commentator notes that: “It seems strange 
indeed that one presumably innocent may be made to undergo something less 
than a fair trial, or that he may be prejudiced in his defense if the prejudice is 
not ‘substantial,’ merely to serve the convenience of the prosecution.”259 
Jurisdictions, however, have the opportunity to not solely rely on a 
judge’s often unmet discretional standards and instead create an additional 
structural and procedural protection for capital defendants. Louisiana made 
a similar discretion-based argument for leaving the joinder decision in the 
 
 254 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 593, 
602 (2d ed. 1999) (“[I]t is very difficult for the trial judge to make a finding on the prejudice 
issue before trial, for it involves speculation about many things which may or not occur. Also, 
judges are understandably reluctant to make a finding of prejudice during trial, after the 
prosecution has put in most or all of its proof.”). 
 255 See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 676 F.2d 239, 243 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 
U.S. 931 (1981) (stating that a defendant must show that the refusal to sever was an abuse of 
discretion); United States v. Mitchell, 788 F.2d 1232, 1237 (7th Cir. 1986) (stating that a 
defendant must show specifically how he would be prejudiced by the joinder); United States 
v. Markey, 693 F.2d 594, 597 (6th Cir. 1982) (stating that “[u]nder Rule 14, Fed.R.Crim.P., 
the disposition of a motion for severance is entrusted to the trial judge’s sound discretion.”); 
United States v. Burton, 724 F.2d 1283, 1286–87 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v. Arbelaez, 
719 F.2d 1453, 1460 (9th Cir. 1983) (stating that defendant must show that the prejudice is so 
compelling as to rise to the level of depriving him his right to a fair trial). 
 256 State v. Henderson, Nos. 963, 964, 965, 1982 WL 5816 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982) (internal 
citation omitted) (citing Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967)). 
 257 AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 13-4 (1980). 
 258 MOORE, supra note 36, ¶ 8.02[1]. 
 259 1 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 141 (1969). 
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hands of the trial judge in the rehearing of McZeal.260 The Louisiana Supreme 
Court disagreed.261 
The court articulated, as discussed above,262 an important distinction 
between misjoinder and severance based on prejudice.263 Following the 
McZeal opinion, Louisiana offers both protections to capital defendants: the 
prejudice analysis under the severance rule and the categorical misjoinder 
rule.264 Not only does the judge have the general authority to consider a 
motion to sever from a defendant and determine whether prejudice exists for 
otherwise properly joined offenses, but capital defendants hold an additional 
procedural protection in misjoinder. By law, if the state charges a defendant 
with a capital offense, the prosecution may not join any noncapital offense 
with it.265 One could argue that the categorical bright-line rule is in itself 
judicially efficient because courts do not need to conduct a balancing test to 
determine whether prejudice exists; it is simply misjoinder to join a capital 
offense with a noncapital offense. 
Although other jurisdictions in the country protect defendants by 
limiting the scenarios and instances where courts may join offenses via 
natural, factual, and temporal restrictions, and other jurisdictions allow 
defendants to request severance of the offenses,266 as long as the prosecution 
can leap over the misjoinder hurdle, commentators would suggest that the 
defendant’s chance at severance is extremely low.267 And if the posture of a 
capital defendant’s trial rides on a judge’s prejudice determination, the risks 
associated with her potential sentence become even greater. By ensuring that 
misjoinder occurs when a capital offense is joined with a noncapital offense, 
Louisiana offers its capital defendants more protection. 
Jurisdictions should recognize that, although they offer a limited means 
of protection through their offense-severance provisions, there is another way 
to protect capital defendants who may suffer the most drastic effects of 
potential biases and errors in trial and conviction. Jurisdictions should create 
an additional, structural misjoinder shield for capital defendants by not 
allowing courts to join capital offenses with noncapital offenses under their 
joinder regimes. 
 
 260 See State v. McZeal, 352 So. 2d 592, 603–04 (La. 1977) (Dennis, J. on rehearing). 
 261 See id. 
 262 See supra Part IV.D. 
 263 See McZeal, 352 So. 2d at 603–04. 
 264 See LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 493, 495.1 (2020). 
 265 See id. art. 493. 
 266 See supra Part II. 
 267 See supra text accompanying notes 254–259. 
2021] MISSING THE MISJOINDER MARK 695 
CONCLUSION 
Jurisdictions should adopt joinder regimes that restrict the joinder of 
offenses when one of the charges brought is a capital offense. They should 
characterize the joinder of a capital offense with any noncapital offense as 
statutory, categorical misjoinder to give capital defendants an additional 
structural and procedural protection in the criminal justice system. 
If jurisdictions revise their joinder schemes in this way, they will 
preserve liberal joinder regimes for the most common criminal cases—ones 
in which joinder is most efficient—without harming those defendants who 
face the most serious consequences and the highest stakes during their trials. 
Such a regime achieves both underlying—and, at times, competing—ends: 
maximal protection against prejudice for capital defendants and judicial 
efficiency. 
APPENDICES 
A. STATES’ JOINDER OF OFFENSES PROVISIONS 
1. States That Maintain the “Felonies or Misdemeanors or Both” Language 
For Alabama, see ALA. R. CRIM. P. 13.3; ALA. CODE § 15-8-52 (2019); 
Boyle v. State, 154 So. 3d 171, 188 (Ala. Crim. App. 2013) (“Rule 13.3 does 
not exclude the consolidation of a capital offense with another lesser 
offense.”) (quoting Williams v. State, 710 So. 2d 1276, 1321 (Ala. Crim. 
App. 1996). The comments to Rule 13.3 state that the rule “is based on Rule 
8(a), Fed.R.Crim.P., and ABA, Standards for Criminal Justice, Joinder and 
Severance, 13-2.1 (2d ed. 1986).” ALA. R. CRIM. P. 13.3. Although § 15-8-
52 of the Alabama Code contains language that might be interpreted to mean 
that joined offenses must bear the same punishment—“and subject to the 
same punishment”—the Rule 13.3 comments explicitly overrule § 15-8-52. 
§ 15-8-52; ALA. R. CRIM. P. 13.3 committee comments (“This rule 
supersedes Ala. Code 1975, § 15-8-52 . . . ”). Further, the Rule 13.3 
Comments specifically address joining misdemeanors and felonies, allowing 
such joinder and changing prior case law. See ALA. R. CRIM. P. 13.3 
committee comments (discussing that the rule specifically allows the joinder 
of misdemeanors and felonies); Brandies v. State, 219 So. 2d 404, 405 (Ala. 
Ct. App. 1968), cert. denied, 219 So. 2d 409 (Ala. 1969). 
For Alaska, see ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 8(a); Guthrie v. State, 222 P.3d 
890, 894 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010) (citing to federal cases which construe 
Federal Criminal Procedure Rule 8(a), “which is substantially similar to 
Alaska Criminal Rule 8(a)” and citing to state jurisdiction cases which 
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construe “state joinder rules identical or substantially similar to Alaska 
Criminal Rule 8(a)”). 
For Arkansas, see ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-85-404 (1987), repealed by 
Arkansas Criminal Code Revision Commission’s Bill, 2005 Ark. Acts 1994; 
ARK. R. CRIM. P. 21.1; Clay v. State, 886 S.W.2d 608, 610 (Ark. 1994) 
(discussing how Rule 21.1 “provides the prosecutor with broad latitude to 
effect joinder of offenses,” and stating that “[t]his joinder rule is much 
broader than the prior statutes . . . .”). 
For Colorado, see COLO. R. CRIM. P. 8(a)(2); Bondsteel v. People, 439 
P.3d 847, 853 (Colo. 2019) (naming Rule 8 the “federal analogue” to 
Colorado’s joinder provision and positively referencing federal cases’ 
interpretations). 
For Florida, see FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.150(a). Despite containing the 
“felonies or misdemeanors or both” language, Florida’s joinder provision 
limits joinder to offenses “triable in the same court.” FLA. R. CRIM. P. 
3.150(a). But this language difference seems to not prevent the joinder of 
offenses of differing levels of punishment. See Rodriguez v. State, 919 So. 
2d 1252, 1272 (Fla. 2005) (finding that offenses were properly joined and 
even if defendant would have filed motion to sever, the motion would have 
most likely failed). 
For Idaho, see IDAHO CRIM. R. 8(a); IDAHO CODE § 19-1432 (2020); 
State v. Field, 165 P.3d 273, 278–79 (Idaho 2007) (citing to and favorably 
referencing a federal case when discussing how to interpret Idaho’s rule). 
For Illinois, see 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/111-4 (2017); People v. 
Fleming, 14 N.E.3d 509, 516 (Ill. Ct. App. 2014) (discussing factors of a 
joinder test to determine whether offenses are joinable as “part of the same 
comprehensive transaction” with no mention of potential sentence of each 
joined offense as a factor to find misjoinder). 
For Kansas, see KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3202 (2019); State v. Gaither, 
156 P.3d 602, 612 (Kan. 2007) (outlining an analysis to determine whether 
joinder was proper in a given case, with no mention of potential sentence of 
joined offenses). Kansas’s joinder provision contains a subsection 
specifically addressing “[w]hen a felony and misdemeanor are joined . . . .” 
§ 22-3202(2). 
For Kentucky, see KY. R. CRIM. P. 6.18; Peacher v. Commonwealth, 
391 S.W.3d 821, 836–37 (Ky. 2013) (discussing the value of Kentucky’s 
liberal joinder regime). 
For Maryland, see MD. R. 4-203(a). The Maryland Rule changes the 
“felonies or misdemeanors or both” language to “whether felonies or 
misdemeanors or any combination thereof . . .” affirming the jurisdiction’s 
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commitment to join any offenses no matter the punishment level. MD. R. 4-
203(a). 
For Mississippi, see MISS. R. CRIM. P. 14.2, 14.3; MISS. CODE ANN. 
§ 99-7-2 (2019). Mississippi Rule 14.2, despite some differences in structure, 
still contains the “felonies or misdemeanors or both” language. See MISS. R. 
CRIM. P. 14.2. 
For Montana, see MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-11-404 (2019). 
For Nebraska, see NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2002(1) (2020); State v. 
Knutson, 852 N.W.2d 307, 316–17 (Neb. 2014) (discussing the analysis to 
determine whether joinder is proper under § 29-2002(1), with no mention of 
potential sentences of joined offenses). 
For New Mexico, see N.M. R. CRIM. P. 5-203, 6-306, 7-306; State v. 
Gallegos, 152 P.3d 828, 832 (N.M. 2007) (discussing New Mexico’s liberal, 
and sometimes mandatory, joinder regime, stating that the original rule was 
based on the ABA Standards Relating to Joinder and Severance, and that 
“[t]he primary focus of such a discretionary rule [was] the promotion of 
judicial efficiency.” (citing 1A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 141, at 5 (3d ed. 1999)). New Mexico’s joinder 
regime is mandatory in some instances, using the phrase, “shall be 
joined . . . .” See N.M. R. CRIM. P. 5-203, 6-306, 7-306. The New Mexico 
Supreme Court, in Gallegos, noted that the adoption of mandatory joinder 
had “the salutary effect of avoiding prejudice to the defendant.” Gallegos, 
152 P.3d at 832 (citing State v. Tijerina, 519 P.2d 127, 132 (N.M. 1973)). 
For North Carolina, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-926 (2020); State v. 
Williams, 565 S.E.2d 609, 626 (N.C. 2002) (discussing the discretion given 
to trial judges to determine whether joinder is proper under the provision, 
with no mention of potential sentences of the joined offenses). 
For Ohio, see OHIO R. CRIM. P. 8; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2941.04 
(2019); State v. LaMar, 767 N.E.2d 166, 189 (Ohio 2002) (upholding the 
joinder of capital offenses with noncapital offenses, stating that the “law 
favors joining multiple offenses in a single trial . . . .” (quoting State v. Lott, 
555 N.E.2d 293, 298 (Ohio 1990)). Ohio’s Rules of Criminal Procedure track 
the Federal Rules, but its joinder statute differs from the language of Federal 
Rule 8(a). Compare § 2941.04 with FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(a). Although 
§ 2941.04 allows for the joinder of all types of offenses “connected together 
in their commission,” the provision does contain a “same class of crimes or 
offenses” limitation for “different statements of the same offense, or two or 
more different offenses . . . .” § 2941.04. This, in effect, limits the joinder of 
offenses of different classes to those connected together in their commission. 
See § 2941.04. For more discussion on the Ohio and Federal joinder rules, 
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see Paul C. Giannelli, Joinder & Severance of Offenses, PUB. DEF. REP., 
Summer 1997, at 1. 
For Rhode Island, see R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 8(a); State v. 
Hernandez, 822 A.2d 915, 918 (R.I. 2003) (upholding the joinder of multiple 
offenses with no discussion of the potential sentences of the joined offenses). 
For South Dakota, see S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 23A-6-23, 23A-11-2 
(2019); State v. Dowty, 838 N.W.2d 820, 828–29 (S.D. 2013) (upholding the 
joinder of multiple offenses with no discussion of the potential sentences of 
the joined offenses). 
For Utah, see UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-8a-1 (2019); State v. Mead, 27 
P.3d 1115, 1130 (Utah 2001) (upholding the joinder of multiple offenses, 
stating that it was “uncontested that the murder and criminal solicitation 
counts” were properly joined, when each offense was classified as a different 
type of felony offense). 
For Vermont, see VT. R. CRIM. P. 8(a). 
For Washington, see WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 4.3(a); State v. 
Bryant, 950 P.2d 1004, 1008 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998) (explaining that the 
joinder provision “should be construed expansively to promote the public 
policy of conserving judicial and prosecution resources.” (citing State v. 
Hentz, 32 647 P.2d 39 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982), rev’d in part on other grounds, 
663 P.2d 476 (Wash 1983))). 
For West Virginia, see W. VA. R. CRIM. P. 8(a); State v. Hatfield, 380 
S.E. 2d 670, 672–75 (W. Va. 1988) (using federal joinder case law, despite 
ultimately finding prejudice, to interpret its own joinder provision as liberal). 
In addition to a permissive joinder provision like the Federal Rules, West 
Virginia also has a mandatory joinder provision. See W. VA. R. CRIM. P. 
8(a)(2). 
For Wisconsin, see WIS. STAT. § 971.12(1) (2019); State v. Salinas, 879 
N.W. 609, 618 (Wis. 2016) (stating that its “joinder statute is to be broadly 
construed in favor of initial joinder”); Francis v. State, 273 N.W. 3d 310, 312 
(Wis. 1979) (“A broad interpretation of the joinder provision is consistent 
with the purposes of joinder, namely trial convenience for the state and 
convenience and advantage to the defendant.”) 
For Wyoming, see WYO. R. CRIM. P. 8(a). The comments to Wyoming’s 
Rule 8 say to compare the Rule to Federal Rule 8. Compare WYO. R. CRIM. 
P. 8 with FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(a). See Duke v. State, 99 P.3d 928, 945 (Wyo. 
2004) (“As a general rule, joinder of offenses is proper absent compelling 
reasons for severance.”); Bell v. State, 994 P.2d 947, 955 (Wyo. 2000) (“Joint 
trials serve the public interest by expediting the administration of justice, 
reducing docket congestion, conserving judicial time as well as that of jurors 
along with avoiding the recall of witnesses to duplicate their 
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performances.”); Bishop v. State, 687 P.2d 242, 247 (Wyo. 1984); Jasch v. 
State, 563 P.2d 1327, 1335 (Wyo. 1977). 
2. States with Similar Language to “Felonies or Misdemeanors or Both” 
For Maine, see ME. R. UNIFIED CRIM. P. 8(a); State v. Lemay, 46 A.3d 
1113, 1118 (Me. 2012) (“The trial court is given ‘wide discretion’ in 
determining whether to join charges for trial, . . . . We interpret Rule 8(a) 
broadly and will uphold joinder if the ‘the offenses charged are connected in 
any reasonable manner.’” (quoting State v. Pierce, 770 A.2d 630, 634 (Me. 
2001))). Maine’s Rule 8 does not contain the “felonies or misdemeanors or 
both” language. Compare ME. R. UNIFIED CRIM. P. 8, with FED. R. CRIM. P. 
8. Instead, it contains the phrase “whether of the same class or different 
classes,” which has the same effect. See ME. R. UNIFIED CRIM. P. 8(a). 
For Missouri, see MO. SUP. CT. R. 23.05; MO. REV. STAT. § 545.140 
(2019); State v. McKinney, 314 S.W. 3d 339, 341 (Mo. 2010) (“Liberal 
joinder of criminal offenses is favored.”); State v. Morrow, 968 S.W. 2d 100, 
109 (Mo. 1998); State v. Simmons, 815 S.W. 2d 426, 428 (Mo. 1991). 
Missouri’s Court Rule 23.05 states that “[a]ll offenses” may be joined and 
the 1979 Committee Note indicates that the Rule should be compared to 
Federal Rule 8(a). MO. SUP. CT. R. 23.05. Missouri’s revised statute includes 
“infraction” as a type of offense that may also be joined with felonies or 
misdemeanors. § 545.140. 
For Nevada, see NEV. REV. STAT. § 173.115 (2019); Weber v. State, 
119 P.3d 107, 119–21 (Nev. 2005) (upholding the death penalty sentence in 
a case where the defendant was charged with seventeen joined offenses with 
no discussion of the potential sentences of the offenses when addressing 
joinder). Nevada’s joinder rule, in line with its offense structure, adds the 
word “gross” before “misdemeanors” in its “felonies or misdemeanors or 
both” language. See § 173.115. 
For North Dakota, see N.D. R. CRIM. P. 8; State v. Wamre, 599 N.W. 
2d 268, 279 (N.D. 1999) (“The purpose of N.D.R.Crim.P. 8 is to provide 
judicial convenience and economy.”); State v. Neufeld, 578 N.W. 2d 536 
(N.D. 1998). North Dakota’s joinder rules also allow for “infractions” to be 
joined with felonies, misdemeanors, or both. N.D. R. CRIM. P. 8. 
For Pennsylvania, see PA. R. CRIM. P. 563. Pennsylvania’s joinder rule 
allows for the joinder of “[t]wo or more offenses, of any grade, . . . .” PA. R. 
CRIM. P. 563. 
For Virginia, see VA. SUP. CT. R. 3A:6(b); Walker v. Commonwealth, 
770 S.E.2d 197, 200 (Va. 2015) (stating that the Court “perceive[s] the 
similarities between Rule 3A:6(b) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
8(a)” and positively referencing federal interpretations). Virginia’s joinder 
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provision reads that “[t]wo or more offenses, any of which may be a felony 
or misdemeanor, . . .” may be joined. VA. SUP. CT. R. 3A:6(b). 
3. States with Language Different From “Felonies or Misdemeanors or 
Both” 
For Arizona, see ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 13.3. Arizona’s joinder provision 
does not contain the “felonies or misdemeanors or both” language, but still 
reads to allow joinder of all types of offenses. See ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 13.3; 
State v. Goudeau, 372 P.3d 945, 970 (Ariz. 2016) (upholding the joinder of 
seventy-four felonies, nine of which were first-degree murder charges for 
which the defendant was sentenced to death). 
For California, see CAL. PENAL CODE § 954 (2019); People v. Landry, 
385 P.3d 327, 351 (Cal. 2016) (affirming a death sentence and joinder of 
multiple offenses with different potential sentences). California’s joinder 
statute differs from the language of Federal Rule 8(a). Section 954 allows for 
the joinder of all types of offenses “connected together in their commission,” 
but the provision contains a “same class of crimes or offenses” limitation for 
“different statements of the same offense or two or more different offenses.” 
PENAL § 954. The language difference might be attributed to the section’s 
1872 enactment date and 1915 substantial amendment date, which both 
occurred before the Federal Rules’ enactment. See generally Mark R. 
McDonald, Prejudicial Joinder under California Penal Code Section 954: 
Judicial Economy at a Premium, 20 PAC. L.J. 1235 (1989) (discussing 
California’s section 954 and concluding that California’s legislature should 
amend the state’s joinder regime to protect a defendant’s right to a fair trial). 
For Connecticut, see CONN. R. SUPER. CT. § 36-21; CONN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 54-57 (2020). Despite the somewhat familiar language of CONN. R. 
SUPER. CT. § 36-21, Connecticut’s joinder regime has been confused over 
recent history. See Andrew Manuel Crespo, The Hidden Law of Plea 
Bargaining, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1303, 1392 n.250 (2018) (discussing the 
confusion and complication surrounding Connecticut’s joinder regime). 
Even with the lack of clarity, the state allows the joinder of offenses 
regardless of the punishment associated with the offenses. See State v. Payne, 
34 A.3d 370, 379–81 (Conn. 2012) (revoking a previous “blanket 
presumption in favor of joinder,” but still upholding a joinder of a felony 
murder offense with other, lesser offenses because an error by the trial court 
was harmless). 
For Delaware, see DEL. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 8(a); Weddington v. 
State, 545 A.2d 607, 615 (Del. 1988) (“The rule of joinder ‘is designed to 
promote judicial economy and efficiency, . . . .’” (quoting Mayer v. State, 
320 A.2d 713, 717 (Del. 1974) rev’d on other grounds)). Delaware’s Rule 8 
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does not contain the “felonies or misdemeanors or both” language but still 
reads to allow for the joinder of all types of offenses. DEL. SUPER. CT. R. 
CRIM. P. 8(a). 
For Georgia, see GA. CODE ANN. § 16-1-7 (2019); Dingler v. State, 211 
S.E.2d 752, 753 (Ga. 1975). Georgia’s joinder provision primarily concerns 
itself with multiple prosecutions for the same crime. See § 16-1-7. When 
addressing joinder, although not using the “felonies or misdemeanors or 
both” language, the provision reads that the defendant may be prosecuted for 
each crime that her conduct falls within. See § 16-1-7. Further, in Dingler v. 
State, the Court adopted the ABA Standards joinder rule, which does contain 
the “felonies or misdemeanors or both” language. Dingler, 211 S.E.2d at 753. 
For Hawaii, see HAW. R. PENAL P. 8; HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 701-
109, 806-22 (2019). Hawaii’s Rule 8 does not contain the “felonies or 
misdemeanors or both” language, but still reads to allow for the joinder of all 
types of offenses. HAW. R. PENAL P. 8. Hawaii’s Criminal Code joinder 
provision does not track the language of the Federal Rules. Compare § 806-
22, with FED. R. CRIM. P. 8. Hawaii case law, however, has made clear that 
the Federal Rules guide analysis of the two joinder provisions. See State v. 
Matias, 550 P.2d 900, 901–02 (Haw. 1976) (turning on Rule 14 but citing 
both HAW. R. PENAL P. 8 and HAW. R. PENAL P. 14 and stating that Hawaii’s 
Rules are derived from the Federal Rules). 
For Indiana, see IND. CODE § 35-34-1-9 (2019); Smoote v. Indiana, 708 
N.E.2d 1, 2 (Ind. 1999) (upholding the joinder of a murder charge and a 
robbery charge). Despite not containing the “felonies or misdemeanors or 
both” language, Indiana’s joinder provision still allows for the joinder of all 
types of offenses, no matter the punishment. See § 35-34-1-9; Hahn v. State, 
67 N.E.3d 1071, 1082–84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (discussing joinder of 
offenses in case where joined offenses have differing levels of punishment). 
For Iowa, see IOWA CT. R. 2.6. Iowa’s Rule 2.6 allows joinder for 
“[t]wo or more indictable public offenses . . . when alleged and prosecuted 
contemporaneously, . . . .” IOWA CT. R. 2.6(1). Iowa’s joinder rule also 
contains the following: “Where a public offense carries with it certain lesser 
included offenses, the latter should not be charged, and it is sufficient to 
charge that the accused committed the major offense.” IOWA CT. R. 2.6(1). 
This provision addresses instances where a defendant may be guilty of lesser 
degrees of one particular offense; prosecutors may still join two offenses with 
differing punishment levels in the same charging document. See IOWA CT. 
R. 2.6(1). 
For Massachusetts, see MASS. R. CRIM. P. 9; Commonwealth v. Gaynor, 
820 N.E.2d 233, 247–48 (Mass. 2005) (upholding the joinder of multiple 
aggravated rape and murder offenses). Massachusetts’s regime allows for 
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joinder of “related offenses,” which can be characterized by the common 
temporal and causal connections of offenses that most other jurisdictions 
have. See MASS. R. CRIM. P. 9. Despite the comments to Massachusetts’s 
joinder rule suggesting that Federal Rule 8 served as a source, “[t]he language 
is drawn largely from the Uniform Rules.” MASS. R. CRIM. P. 9. Even with a 
different source, the Massachusetts Rule allows for the joinder of offenses 
with different levels of punishment. See MASS. R. CRIM. P. 9. 
For Michigan, see MICH. CT. R. 6.120. Despite having language 
differing from the Federal Rules, the Michigan rule still allows for 
prosecutors to join “any two or more offenses.” MICH. CT. R. 6.120(A). 
For Minnesota, see MINN. R. CRIM. P. 17.03; State v. Profit, 591 
N.W.2d 451, 459 (Minn. 1999) (upholding the joinder of two counts of first-
degree murder with other, less serious offenses). Despite having language 
differing from the Federal Rules, the Minnesota rule states, plainly and 
simply, that “[w]hen the defendant’s conduct constitutes more than one 
offense, each offense may be charged in the same charging document in a 
separate count.” MINN. R. CRIM. P. 17.03. 
For New Hampshire, see N.H. R. CRIM. P. 20. New Hampshire’s regime 
allows for joinder of “related offenses,” which has been defined as “those 
that are based upon the same conduct, upon a single criminal episode, or upon 
a common plan,” which resembles the limitations adopted in other 
jurisdictions. State v. Ramos, 818 A.2d 1228, 1230 (N.H. 2001); see also 
N.H. R. CRIM. P. 20. New Hampshire allows offenses to be joined no matter 
the level of potential punishment. See N.H. R. CRIM. P. 20. Further, New 
Hampshire requires joinder in some instances. See N.H. R. CRIM. P. 20(a)(4). 
For New Jersey, see N.J. CT. R. 3:7-6; State v. Long, 575 A.2d 435 (N.J. 
1990), rev’d on other grounds (upholding the joinder of a capital offense with 
a noncapital offense). New Jersey’s joinder rule does not contain the 
“felonies or misdemeanors or both” language, but still reads to allow for the 
joinder of all types of offenses. N.J. CT. R. 3:7-6. 
For New York, see N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 200.20 (2019). Despite 
the difference in language from the federal joinder regime, New York’s 
joinder rule still allows for the joinder of all types of offenses no matter the 
potential punishment, even “petty offenses.” CRIM. PROC. § 200.20. 
For Oklahoma, see OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, §§ 404, 436 (2019); Glass v. 
State, 701 P.2d 765, 768 (Okla. 1985); Note, Criminal Procedure: Joinder 
of Offenses in Oklahoma A Catch in Title 22, 27 OKLA. L. REV. 499 (1974). 
Despite Oklahoma’s unique joinder history, Oklahoma allows the joinder of 
all offenses no matter the potential punishment of the offenses. See, e.g., 
Holtzclaw v. State, 448 P.3d 1134, 1144–45 (Okla. Ct. App. 2019). 
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For Oregon, see OR. REV. STAT. § 132.560 (2019). Oregon’s joinder 
statute’s language is different from the Federal Rules. See § 132.560. Further, 
the general rule in Oregon is that a charging instrument “must charge but one 
offense,” but allows for the joinder of multiple offenses as an exception. 
§ 132.560. The rule still reads to allow the joinder of all types of offenses, 
regardless of punishment. See § 132.560; State v. Taylor, 434 P.3d 331 (Or. 
2019). 
For South Carolina, see State v. Simmons, 573 S.E.2d 856, 860–61 
(S.C. Ct. App. 2002). Despite only addressing joinder in the context of 
whether the defendant’s conduct is temporally connected or similar in nature, 
nothing in South Carolina’s jurisprudential joinder regime appears to 
structurally deny the possibility of joining offenses of differing levels of 
punishment, and South Carolina case law supports the proposition that the 
decision to join offenses is left to the discretion of the trial court. See 
generally State v. Blakely, 742 S.E. 2d 29 (S.C. Ct. App. 2013); State v. 
Hinson, 172 S.E. 2d 548, 551 (S.C. 1970); State v. Evans, 99 S.E. 751, 751 
(S.C. 1919). 
For Tennessee, see TENN. R. CRIM. P. 8; State v. Carruthers, 35 S.W. 
3d 516, 573 (Tenn. 2000) (upholding the joinder of multiple offenses and 
death sentence for one defendant and stating, “The purpose of Rule 8 is to 
promote efficient administration of justice . . . .”). Despite the difference in 
language from the federal joinder regime, Tennessee still allows the joinder 
of all offenses no matter the potential punishment and even has mandatory 
joinder in some instances. See TENN. R. CRIM. P. 8. 
For Texas, see TEX. PENAL CODE § 3.02 (2019); TEX. CODE CRIM. 
PROC. art. 21.24 (2019). Texas’s joinder regime is different from that of the 
other jurisdictions’ regimes because it generally allows the defendant a 
universal right of severance. See PENAL § 3.04. As one commentator notes, 
the joinder regime bears resemblance to the reform proposals of Michael L. 
Seigel & Christopher Slobogin. See Andrew Manuel Crespo, The Hidden 
Law of Plea Bargaining, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1303, 1322 n.56 (2018) 
(discussing Texas’s provisions similarities to proposals in Michael L. Seigel 
& Christopher Slobogin, Prosecuting Martha: Federal Prosecutorial Power 
and the Need for a Law of Counts, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1107, 1128 (2005)). 
Even though the defendant may receive severance in most instances sought, 
the defendant forfeits the guarantee of concurrent sentences of the crimes. 
See PENAL § 3.04(b). Further, Texas prosecutors still maintain the power to 
join any offenses at the outset, no matter the level of potential punishment. 
See generally. PENAL § 3.02, 3.04; CRIM. PROC. art. 21.24. 
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B. STATES’ SEVERANCE PROVISIONS 
For Alabama, see ALA. R. CRIM. P. 13.4; Tariq-Madqun v. State, 59 So. 
3d 744, 749 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010) (“We review a trial court’s ruling on a 
motion to sever for an abuse of discretion.”); Minnis v. State, 690 So. 2d 521, 
524–25 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996) (“It is only the most compelling prejudice, 
against which the trial court will not be able to afford protection, that will be 
sufficient to show the court abused its discretion in not granting a severance.” 
(citing United States v. Perez, 489, F.2d 51, 65 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 
417 U.S. 845 (1974)); Summerlin v. State, 594 So. 2d 235, 236 (Ala. Crim. 
App. 1991) (“The granting of a severance rests within the discretion of the 
trial court and its refusal to sever counts . . . will only be reversed for a clear 
abuse of discretion.”). 
For Alaska, see ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 14; Montes v. State, 669 P.2d 961, 
966 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (“[D]enial of a motion for severance under 
Criminal Rule 14 will be reversed only when the court has abused its 
discretion and a showing of prejudice to the defendant has been made.” (first 
citing Hawley v. State, 614 P.2d 1349, 1360 (Alaska 1980); and then citing 
Catlett v. State, 585 P.2d 553, 556 (Alaska 1978))). 
For Arizona, see ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 13.4; State v. Prince, 61 P.3d 450, 
453 (Ariz. 2003) (“The trial court has broad discretion in such matters. Its 
decision will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of such discretion.” (citing 
State v. Walden, 905 P.2d 974, 984 (Ariz. 1995))); State v. Murray, 906 P.2d 
542, 558 (1995) (“When a defendant challenges a denial of severance on 
appeal, he ‘must demonstrate compelling prejudice against which the trial 
court was unable to protect.’” (quoting State v. Cruz, 672 P.2d 470, 473 
(Ariz. 1983))). 
For Arkansas, see ARK. R. CRIM. P. 22.2; Holsombach v. State, 246 
S.W.3d 871, 879 (Ark. 2007) (stating, while affirming the consolidation of a 
capital murder offense, an attempted capital murder offense, a kidnapping 
offense, and an aggravated robbery offense, that “[j]oinder, consolidation, 
and severance of indictments for trial are procedural matters . . . . Granting 
or refusing a severance is a matter within the discretion of the trial court.” 
(first citing Owen v. State, 565 S.W.2d 607, 611–12 (Ark. 1978); and then 
citing Passley v. State, 915 S.W.2d 248, 251–52 (Ark. 1996))). In addition, 
in Arkansas, a defendant has an absolute right of severance when offenses 
are solely joined “on the ground that they are of same or similar character.” 
Passley, 915 S.W.2d at 251 (citing Clay v. State, 886 S.W.2d 608 (Ark. 
1994)). See also ARK. R. CRIM. P. 22.2(a) (“Whenever two (2) or more 
offenses have been joined for trial solely on the ground that they are of the 
same or similar character and they are not part of a single scheme or plan, the 
defendant shall have a right to a severance of the offenses.”). 
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For California, see CAL. PENAL CODE § 954 (2020); People v. Landry, 
385 P.3d 327, 351 (Cal. 2016) (“Contrary to defendant’s argument, we do 
not apply a heightened standard in assessing severance issues in capital 
cases.”). 
For Colorado, see COLO. R. CRIM. P. 14; People v. Raehal, 401 P.3d 
117, 121 (Colo. App. 2017) (“We review a decision concerning the joinder 
of separate charges for an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs 
when the joinder causes actual prejudice . . . .” (first citing People v. Curtis, 
350 P.3d 949 (Colo. App. 2014); and then citing People v. Gregg, 298 P.3d 
983, 985–86 (Colo. App. 2011))). 
For Connecticut, see CONN. R. SUPER. CT. § 41-18; State v. Payne, 34 
A.3d 370, 379 (Conn. 2012) (revoking a previous “blanket presumption in 
favor of joinder,” but still upholding a joinder of a felony murder offense 
with other, lesser offenses because an error by the trial court was harmless). 
For Delaware, see DEL. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 14; Lampkins v. State, 
465 A.2d 785, 794 (Del. 1983) (deciding on a severance of defendant’s issue, 
stating that “[severance] is a matter within the sound discretion of the Trial 
Court; and the defendant has the burden of demonstrating ‘substantial 
injustice’ and unfair prejudice.” (citing Bates v. State, 386 A.2d 1139, 1142 
(Del. 1978))). 
For Florida, see FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.152 (2019); Fotopoulos v. State, 608 
So. 2d 784, 790 (Fla. 1992) (“A defendant also is entitled to severance of 
properly joined related offenses upon a showing that such is necessary to 
achieve a fair determination of the defendant’s guilt or innocence of each 
offense. However, grant a severance is largely a matter within the trial court’s 
discretion.”) (citations omitted); Rodriguez v. State, 919 So. 2d 1252 (Fla. 
2005) (finding that offenses were properly joined and even if defendant 
would have filed motion to sever, the motion would have most likely failed). 
For Georgia, see GA. CODE ANN. § 16-1-7(c) (2020); Dingler v. State, 
211 S.E.2d 752, 753 (Ga. 1975) (“Necessarily, then, severance in this 
particular kind of circumstance lies within the sound discretion of the trial 
judge since the facts in each case are likely to be unique.”). 
For Hawaii, see HAW. R. PENAL P. 14; HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 806-
22 (2020); State v. Balanza, 1 P.3d 281, 290–91 (Haw. 2000) (“The decision 
to sever is in the sound discretion of the trial court; a defendant is not entitled 
to a severance as a matter of right.” (citing State v. Matias, 550 P.2d 900, 902 
(Haw. 1976))). 
For Idaho, see IDAHO CRIM. R. 14; State v. Abel, 664 P.2d 772, 774 
(Idaho 1983) (positively referencing federal severance jurisprudence and 
stating that motions for severance “are directed to the trial court’s 
discretion.”). 
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For Illinois, see 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/114-8 (2019); People v. 
Fleming, 14 N.E.3d 509, 517 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014) (“The trial court has broad 
discretion to sever, and, as a reviewing court, we affirm unless that decision 
constitutes an abuse of discretion. A trial court abuses its discretion where its 
decision is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or when no reasonable person 
would take the trial court’s view.” (first citing People v. Patterson, 615 
N.E.2d 11 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); and then citing People v. Illgen, 583 N.E.2d 
515 (Ill. 1991)). 
For Indiana, see IND. CODE § 35-34-1-11 (2020). 
For Iowa, see IOWA CT. R. 2.6; State v. Elston, 735 N.W.2d 196, 199 
(Iowa 2007) (“To prove the district court abused its discretion in refusing to 
sever charges, [the defendant] bears the burden of showing prejudice 
resulting from joinder outweighed the State’s interest in judicial economy.” 
(citing State v. Oetken, 613 N.W.2d 679, 689 (Iowa 2000))). 
For Kansas, see State v. Shaffer, 624 P.2d 440, 443 (Kan. 1981) (“When 
joinder of offenses is proper . . . a motion for severance rests largely in the 
sound discretion of the trial court and severance may be ordered to prevent 
prejudice and manifest injustice to the defendant. The accused’s election to 
testify on some but not all of the charges at trial does not automatically 
require a severance. Whether there has been prejudicial joinder involves 
weighing prejudice incurred by defendant because of said joinder against 
judicial economy resulting from a joint trial plus any other considerations 
which militate against severance.” (first citing State v. Howell, 573 P.2d 1003 
(1977); then citing United States v. Forrest, 623 F.2d 1107, 1115 (5th Cir. 
1980); and then citing United States v. Cuesta, 597 F.2d 903, 919 (5th Cir. 
1979), cert. denied 444 U.S. 964 (1979))). 
For Kentucky, see KY. R. CRIM. P. 8.31; Peacher v. Commonwealth, 
391 S.W.3d 821, 839 (Ky. 2013) (“Only if the defendant can show that he 
was thus actually prejudiced by an erroneous refusal to sever is he entitled to 
appellate relief.” (citing Rearick v. Commonwealth, 858 S.W.2d 185, 188 
(Ky. 1993); United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 438–39 (1986) (holding that 
misjoinder of offenses under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 8(b) 
warrants appellate relief only upon a showing of actual prejudice))). 
For Maine, see ME. R. UNIF. CRIM. P. 8 (2019); State v. Lemay, 46 A.3d 
1113, 1119 (Me. 2012) (“We construe Rule 8(d) liberally in order to 
adequately protect the defendant from undue prejudice. Nonetheless, we 
review the court’s decision to deny a motion for severance for an abuse of 
discretion and will not vacate a decision to deny a motion ‘unless the case is 
one in which the potential for confusion or prejudice is obviously serious.’” 
(quoting and citing State v. Pierce, 770 A.2d 630, 634–36 (Me. 2001))); State 
v. Rich, 395 A.2d 1123, 1128 (Me. 1978) (“The court has wide discretion in 
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deciding such matters, and its decision is not grounds for new trial unless 
prejudice and abuse of discretion are shown.”) (citation omitted). 
For Maryland, see MD. R. 4-253 (2019). 
For Massachusetts, see MASS. R. CRIM. P. 9; Commonwealth v. Moran, 
422 N.E.2d 399, 406 (Mass. 1982) (deciding a joinder-of-defendants issue, 
but likening the Massachusetts severance provision to the federal severance 
provision) (“[Massachusetts Rule of Criminal Procedure 9] generally tracks 
Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.”). 
For Michigan, see MICH. CT. R. 6.120; People v. Tobey, 257 N.W.2d 
537 (Mich. 1977); People v. Abraham, 662 N.W.2d 836, 842 (Mich. Ct. App. 
2003). While Michigan’s Rule 6.120 provides for a universal right of 
severance, it only does so when the joined offenses are “unrelated,” that is, 
not connected by one of the linking characteristics of joined offenses. See 
MICH. CT. R. 6.120. Properly joined, or “related,” offenses may still only be 
severed “when appropriate to promote fairness to the parties and a fair 
determination of the defendant’s guilt or innocence of each offense.” Id. 
For Minnesota, see MINN. R. CRIM. P. 17.03; State v. Kendell, 723 
N.W.2d 597, 608 (Minn. 2006) (“Rule 17.03 requires severance of offenses, 
even related offenses, if severance is ‘appropriate to promote a fair 
determination of the defendant’s guilt’—that is, if joinder would unfairly 
prejudice the defendant.” (first citing MINN. R. CRIM. P. 17.03 3(1)(b); then 
citing State v. Profit, 591 N.W.2d 451, 458–59 (Minn. 1999); and then citing 
State v. White, 292 N.W.2d 16, 18 (Minn. 1980))). 
For Mississippi, see MISS. R. CRIM. P. 14.3. 
For Missouri, see MO. SUP. CT. R. 24.07; State v. Morrow, 968 S.W.2d 
100, 109 (Mo. 1998) (“The decision regarding severance is left to the sound 
discretion of the trial court.” (citing State v. McCrary, 621 S.W.2d 266, 272 
(Mo. 1981) (en banc))). 
For Montana, see MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-13-211 (2019); State v. 
Southern, 980 P.2d 3, 8 (Mont. 1999) (explaining that a criminal defendant 
has the burden of proving that severance “is necessary to prevent unfair 
prejudice”); State v. Richards, 906 P.2d 222, 226 (Mont. 1995); State v. 
Martin, 926 P.2d 1380, 1384–85 (Mont. 1996); State v. Slice, 753 P.2d 1309, 
1310–11 (Mont. 1988). 
For Nebraska, see NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2002 (2019); State v. Knutson, 
852 N.W.2d 307, 315–18 (Neb. 2014) (stating that the Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 14(a) is “the federal equivalent” to Nebraska’s severance 
provision and looking to federal case law for guidance on when to grant 
severance); State v. Foster, 839 N.W.2d 783, 795 (Neb. 2013). 
For Nevada, see NEV. REV. STAT. § 174.165 (2019); Rimer v. State, 351 
P.3d 697, 709–10 (Nev. 2015) (“Like it’s federal counterpart [Federal Rule 
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14(a)], [§] 174.165(1) ‘does not require severance even if prejudice is shown; 
rather, it leaves the tailoring of the relief to be granted, if any, to the district 
court’s sound discretion.’” (citing Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 538–
39 (1993))); Honeycutt v. State, 56 P.3d 362, 367 (Nev. 2002) (“To require 
severance, the defendant must demonstrate that a joint trial would be 
manifestly prejudicial. The simultaneous trial of the offenses must render the 
trial fundamentally unfair, and hence, result in a violation of due process.” 
(internal quotations omitted)), overruled on other grounds by Carter v. State, 
121 P.3d 592, 596 (Nev. 2005). 
For New Hampshire, see N.H. R. CRIM. P. 20; State v. Ramos, 149 N.H. 
118, 119, 121, 127 (N.H. 2003) (creating a new severance rule, by which 
criminal defendants have a right of severance of “unrelated” offenses, 
commenting on New Hampshire’s limited discretion used in joinder and 
severance, and discussing other jurisdictions’ joinder and severance 
regimes). 
For New Jersey, see N.J. CT. R. 3:15-2; State v. Brown, 784 A.2d 1244, 
1258–59 (N.J. 2001) (addressing a case of co-defendants, stating, “When 
considering a motion to sever, a court must balance the potential prejudice to 
a defendant against the interest in judicial economy, . . . . The determination 
whether to grant a severance was addressed to the trial court’s guided 
discretion.”); State v. Brown, 573 A.2d 886, 891 (N.J. 1990) (addressing a 
case of co-defendants, stating, “The danger by association [of the defendants’ 
charged offenses] that inheres in all joint trials is not in itself sufficient to 
justify a severance . . . .” (citing State v. Freeman, 312 A.2d 143, 144 (N.J. 
1973)). 
For New Mexico, see N.M. STAT. ANN. § 5-203 (2019); State v. Garcia, 
246 P.3d 1057, 1064 (N.M. 2011) (“The decision to grant a severance motion 
lies within the trial judge’s discretion and will not be overturned on appeal 
unless the joinder of offenses results in actual prejudice against the moving 
party.”) (emphasis in original); State v. Dominguez, 171 P.3d 750, 752–53 
(N.M. 2007); State v. Gallegos, 152 P.3d 828, 834 (N.M. 2007); State v. 
Ramming, 738 P.2d 914, 918–19 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987); State v. Duffy, 967 
P.2d 807, 819 (N.M. 1998). 
For New York, see N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 200.20 (2019); People v. 
Lane, 436 N.E.2d 456, 451 (N.Y. 1982) (“[S]everance will be granted only 
if he can persuade the court that the severance should be granted ‘in the 
interest of justice and for good cause shown.’”) (quoting CRIM. PROC. 
§ 200.20(3)). 
For North Carolina, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-927 (2019); State v. 
Nelson, 260 S.E.2d 629, 640 (N.C. 1979) (discussing joinder of defendants, 
stating, “Unless the accused suffered some apparent and palpable injustice in 
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the trial below, this court will not interfere with the decision of the court on 
the motion for a severance.” (quoting State v. Finley, 24 S.E. 495, 496 (N.C. 
1896))). 
For North Dakota, see N.D. R. CRIM. P. 14; State v. Purdy, 491 N.W.2d 
402, 405–06 (N.D. 1992) (“The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating 
prejudicial joinder. Bare allegations that a defendant would stand a better 
chance of acquittal in a separate trial or that there may be some ‘spillover 
effect’ from evidence against a codefendant is insufficient to compel 
severance. We will not set aside a trial court’s refusal to grant a separate trial 
unless the defendant establishes a clear abuse of discretion.”) (citations 
omitted); State v. Dymowski, 459 N.W.2d 777, 779 (N.D. 1990). 
For Ohio, see OHIO CRIM. R. 14; State v. Brinkley, 824 N.E.2d 959, 971 
(Ohio 2005) (“The defendant, however, bears the burden of proving 
prejudice and of proving that the trial court abused its discretion in denying 
severance.”); State v. Lott, 555 N.E.2d 293, 298 (Ohio 1990); State v. Torres, 
421 N.E.2d 1288, 1290 (Ohio 1981). 
For Oklahoma, see OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 439 (2019); Neill v. State, 
827 P.2d 884, 886 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992) (discussing severance of joined 
defendants but stating, “The decision to grant or deny severance is left to the 
sound discretion of the trial court. This Court has recognized that it is in the 
interest of both justice and economy to jointly charge and try those who have 
allegedly participated in the same criminal act, and we have urged trial courts 
to do so whenever possible. Absent an abuse of discretion resulting in 
prejudice to the appellant, the decision of the trial court will not be disturbed 
on appeal.” (citing Cook v. State, 699 P.2d 653, 658 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985); 
Menefee v. State, 640 P.2d 1381, 1383 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982); Faubion v. 
State, 569 P.2d 1022, 1025 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977))). 
For Oregon, see OR. REV. STAT. § 132.560 (2019); State v. Meyer, 820 
P.2d 861, 863 (Or. Ct. App. 1991) (“In determining whether joinder is 
allowable, the court must keep in mind that ‘the availability of severance 
under rule 14 [§ 132.560(3)] as a remedy for prejudice that may develop 
during the trial permits rule 8 [§ 132.560(2)] to be broadly construed in favor 
of initial joinder.” (internal brackets omitted) (citing United States v. 
Rodgers, 732 F.2d 625, 629 (8th Cir. 1984))). 
For Pennsylvania, see PA. R. CRIM. P. 583; Commonwealth v. 
Melendez-Rodriguez, 856 A.2d 1278, 1282 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (en banc) 
(“‘[A] motion for severance is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial 
court, and . . . its decision will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of 
discretion.’ The critical consideration is whether [the] appellant was 
prejudiced by the trial court’s decision not to sever. [The a]ppellant bears the 
burden of establishing such prejudice.” (citations omitted) (quoting 
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Commonwealth v. Jones, 610 A.2d 931, 936 (Pa. 1992)) (first citing 
Commonwealth v. Lopez, 739 A.2d 485, 501 (Pa. 1999); and then citing 
Commonwealth v. Carroll, 418 A.2d 702, 704 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980))); 
Commonwealth v. Dozzo, 991 A.2d, 898, 901–02 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010). 
For Rhode Island, see R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 14; State v. Pereira, 
973 A.2d 19, 27–28 (R.I. 2009) (“Rule 14, like Rule 8, protects defendants 
from prosecutorial harassment and unfair advantage, while at the same time 
balancing the public’s interest in avoiding the cost of repetitive trials. 
However, severance is not a matter of right, and the determination of whether 
to sever charges under Rule 14 lies within the sound discretion of the trial 
justice. Therefore, this court will not disturb a trial justice’s decision under 
Rule 14 absent a clear abuse of discretion . . . . The defendant must show that 
he did, in fact, suffer real and substantial prejudice.”) (internal citations 
omitted); State v. King, 693 A.2d 658, 663 (R.I. 1997) (“To prevail in 
demonstrating that a trial justice has abused this discretion, a defendant must 
show that the trial justice’s denial of the motion to sever prejudiced the 
defendant to such a degree that he or she was denied a fair trial.” (quoting 
State v. Eddy, 519 A.2d 1137, 1140 (R.I. 1987))). 
For South Carolina, see State v. Simmons, 573 S.E.2d 856, 860–61 
(S.C. Ct. App. 2002). South Carolina case law supports the proposition that 
the decision to join offenses is left to the discretion of the trial court. See 
generally State v. Blakely, 742 S.E.2d 29, 36 (S.C. Ct. App. 2013); State v. 
Hinson, 172 S.E.2d 548, 551 (S.C. 1970); State v. Evans, 99 S.E. 751, 751 
(S.C. 1919). 
For South Dakota, see S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-11-2 (2019); State 
v. Dixon, 419 N.W.2d 699, 702–03 (S.D. 1988) (discussing joinder and 
severance tests in other jurisdictions and stating, “We have interpreted the 
statutes to mean that the decision not to sever is firmly within the discretion 
of the trial court and absent a clear showing of prejudice to substantial rights 
of the defendant, there is no abuse of discretion.”). 
For Tennessee, see TENN. R. CRIM. P. 14; State v. Shirley, 6 S.W.3d 
243, 245 (Tenn. 1999) (clarifying the state’s severance jurisprudence and 
stating that “[f]or the reasons set forth below, we hold that a denial of a 
severance will only be reversed for an abuse of discretion.”). 
For Texas, see TEX. PENAL CODE § 3.04 (West 2019). Texas’s joinder 
regime is different from that of the other jurisdictions’ regimes because it 
generally allows the defendant a universal right of severance. See PENAL 
§ 3.04. Even though the defendant may receive severance in most instances 
sought, the defendant forfeits the guarantee of concurrent sentences of the 
convictions. See PENAL § 3.04(b). Further, Texas prosecutors still maintain 
the power to join any offenses at the outset, no matter the level of potential 
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punishment, which this Article seeks to address. See generally PENAL 
§§ 3.02, 3.04; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 21.24 (West 2019). 
For Utah, see UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-8a-1 (West 2019); State v. Lopez, 
789 P.2d 39, 42 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (“[T]he grant or denial of severance is 
a matter within the discretion of the trial judge, so we reverse [a denial] only 
if the trial judge’s refusal to sever charges ‘is a clear abuse of discretion in 
that it sacrifices the defendant’s right to a fundamentally fair trial.’” (quoting 
State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338, 1350 (Utah 1997))). 
For Vermont, see VT. R. CRIM. P. 14; State v. Venman, 564 A.2d 574, 
578 (Vt. 1989) (“In order to obtain a severance, the defendant had to show 
that the severance was appropriate (before trial) or necessary (during trial) 
for ‘a fair determination of of [sic] the defendant’s guilt or innocence of each 
offense.’ V.R.Cr.P. 14(b)(1)(B). The trial court has discretion in making this 
determination.” (citing State v. Chenette, 560 A.2d 365, 370 (Vt. 1989))). 
For Virginia, see VA. SUP. CT. R. 3A:10; Goodson v. Commonwealth, 
467 S.E.2d 848, 853 (Va. Ct. App. 1996) (“In determining whether a joint 
trial would prejudice a defendant, the trial court should ‘require [t]he party 
moving for severance [to] establish that actual prejudice would result from a 
joint trial.’” (quoting United States v. Reavis, 48 F.3d 763, 767 (4th Cir. 
1995) cert. denied 115 S.Ct. 2597 (1995))). 
For Washington, see WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 4.4; State v. Bythrow, 
790 P.2d 154, 156 (Wash. 1990) (“The failure of the trial court to sever 
counts is reversible only upon a showing that the court’s decision was a 
manifest abuse of discretion. Defendants seeking severance have the burden 
of demonstrating that a trial involving both counts would be so manifestly 
prejudicial as to outweigh the concern for judicial economy.” (citing State v. 
Philips, 741 P.2d 24, 33 (Wash. 1987) (a case concerning joinder of 
defendants))); State v. Thompson, 564 P.2d 315, 318 (Wash. 1977); State v. 
Smith, 446 P.2d 571, 578 (Wash. 1968), vacated in part, 408 U.S. 934 
(1972), overruled on other grounds by State v. Gosby, 539 P.2d 680, 686 
(Wash. 1975). 
For West Virginia, see W. VA. R. CRIM. P. 14; State v. Milburn, 511 
S.E.2d 828, 833 (W. Va. 1998); State v. Penwell, 483 S.E.2d 240, 247 (W. 
Va. 1996) (reviewing federal authority to decide severance issue); State v. 
Hatfield, 380 S.E.2d 670, 674 (W. Va. 1988) (“The decision to grant a motion 
for severance pursuant to [W. VA. R. CRIM. P.] 14(a) is a matter within the 
sound discretion of the trial court.”); State v. Ludwick, 475 S.E.2d 70, 73 (W. 
Va. 1996) (“Rule 14 of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure is 
[modeled] on Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, . . . .”). 
For Wisconsin, see WIS. STAT. § 971.12 (2019); State v. Locke, 502 
N.W.2d 891, 894 (Wis. 1993) (“A motion for severance is addressed to the 
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trial court’s discretion . . . . An erroneous exercise of discretion, in the 
balancing of these competing interests, will not be found unless the defendant 
can establish that failure to sever the counts caused “substantial prejudice.” 
(quoting and citing State v. Hoffman, 316 N.W.2d 143, 157 (Wis. Ct. App. 
1982))). 
For Wyoming, see WYO. R. CRIM. P. 14; Duke v. State, 99 P.3d 928, 
945 (Wyo. 2004) (“Any prejudice caused by the joinder is weighed against 
the judicial economies created by joinder.”); Bell v. State, 994 P.2d 947, 955 
(Wyo. 2000); Dorador v. State, 768 P.2d 1049, 1052 (Wyo. 1989); Lee v. 
State, 653 P.2d 1388, 1390 (Wyo. 1982). 
C. JURISDICTIONS’ DEATH PENALTY PROVISIONS 
1. Jurisdictions with Statutory Authority to Use Death Penalty 
For Alabama, see, e.g., ALA. CRIM. CODE §§ 13A-5-2, 13A-5-39 
(defining “capital offense” as “[a]n offense for which a defendant shall be 
punished by a sentence of death or life imprisonment without parole, . . . ”), 
13A-5-40 (listing nineteen murder crimes that can be capitally charged) 
(2019). 
For Arizona, see, e.g., AZ. REV. STAT. §§ 13-1105 (defining first degree 
murder); 13-751 (2019) (listing aggravating circumstances that must be 
proven for death penalty to be imposed). 
For Arkansas, see, e.g., ARK. CRIM. CODE §§ 5-10-101 (defining 
“capital murder”); 5-4-602 (listing procedures governing “a trial of a person 
charged with capital murder”) (2019). 
For Delaware, see, e.g., DEL. CODE tit. 11, § 4209 (2019). But see Rauf 
v. State, 145 A.3d 430, 477–79 (Del. 2016) (finding Delaware’s existing 
death penalty provision unconstitutional). 
For Florida, see, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 775.082(1)(a) (“[A] person who 
has been convicted of a capital felony shall be punished by death . . . .”); 
782.04 (defining murder in the first degree as a capital felony); 921.141 
(“Sentence of death or life imprisonment for capital felonies; further 
proceedings to determine sentence.”) (2019). 
For Georgia, see, e.g., GA. CODE § 17-10-30 (2019) (defining those 
offenses for which the death penalty may be imposed). 
For Idaho, see, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 19-2515 (2019) (stating that “a 
person convicted of murder in the first degree shall be liable for the 
imposition the penalty of death . . . ”). 
For Indiana, see, e.g., IND. CODE § 35-50-2-3(b)(1)(A) (2019) 
(indicating murder may be punished by death). 
2021] MISSING THE MISJOINDER MARK 713 
For Kansas, see, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-5401 (defining capital 
murder); 21-6622 (2019) (discussing sentencing for capital murder). 
For Kentucky, see, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.020(2) (West 
2019) (defining murder as a capital offense). 
For Louisiana, see, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. § 14:30(C)(1) (2019) 
(indicating that district attorney may seek a capital verdict in charge of first-
degree murder). 
For Mississippi, see, e.g., MISS. CODE § 97-3-19 (2019) (defining 
crimes that constitute capital offenses). 
For Missouri, see, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 565.020 (2019) (establishing 
death penalty as a potential sentence for first-degree murder). 
For Nebraska, see, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-105(1) (defining the 
sentence for Class I felonies as death); 29-2523(1) (listing aggravating 
circumstances). 
For Nevada, see, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 176.025 (discussing death 
penalty); 200.030(4)(a) (establishing when a person convicted of murder will 
be punished by death); 200.033 (listing aggravating circumstances). 
For North Carolina, see, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17(1) (2019) 
(indicating murder in the first degree can be punished by the death penalty). 
For Ohio, see, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE § 2929.04 (2019) (defining those 
aggravating factors which allow for the imposition of the death penalty for 
aggravated murder). 
For Oklahoma, see, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.9(A) (2019) 
(indicating murder in the first degree may be punished by death). 
For Pennsylvania, see, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1102(a) (2019) 
(indicating first degree murder may be punished by death). 
For South Carolina, see, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(A) (2019) 
(indicating potential death penalty sentence for murder). 
For South Dakota, see, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-4 (2019); 
see also S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ch. 23A-27A (2019). 
For Tennessee, see, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-202(c)(1) (2019) 
(indicating that the crime of first-degree murder is punishable by death). 
For Texas, see, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31(a) (West 2019) 
(indicating that “[a]n individual adjudged guilty of a capital felony in a case 
in which the state seeks the death penalty shall be punished by imprisonment 
in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for life without parole or by 
death”). 
For Utah, see, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-206(2)(a)(i) (West 2019) 
(defining sentences for capital felonies, one of which is death). 
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For Wyoming, see, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-101(b) (2019) 
(indicating first-degree murder can be punished by death). 
For the federal criminal system, see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3591 (2019) 
(defining those offenses which may receive a death sentence). 
2. States with Moratoriums on the Death Penalty 
For California, see, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 37 (indicating treason 
may have a death penalty sentence); 187 (defining first degree murder); 190 
(indicating first-degree murder may have a death penalty sentence) (West 
2019); Cal. Executive Order N-09-19 (2019) (instituting a moratorium on 
usage of the death penalty). 
For Montana, see, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-102(2) (2019) 
(indicating Deliberate homicide shall be punished by death); Tribune Capitol 
Bureau, Judge Knocks Down Death Penalty Drug, GREAT FALLS TRIB. (Oct. 
6, 2015, 4:28 PM), https://www.greatfallstribune.com/story/news/2015
/10/06/judge-knocks-down-death-penalty-drug/73481198 [https://perma.cc/
2Y5K-UA3N]. 
For Oregon, see, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 163.105(1)(a) (2019) 
(indicating aggravated murder can be punished by death); Tony Hernandez, 




3. States That Have Abolished the Death Penalty 
For Alaska, see, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.015 (2019). 
For Colorado, see, e.g., 2020 Colo. Sess. Laws 204; Jesse Paul & John 
Ingold, Governor Signs Bill Abolishing Colorado’s Death Penalty, 
Commutes Sentences of State’s 3 Death Row Inmates, COLO. SUN (Mar. 23, 
2020, 3:53 PM), https://coloradosun.com/2020/03/23/colorado-death-
penalty-repeal [https://perma.cc/T27W-J9KV]. 
For Connecticut, see, e.g., Daniela Altimari, Without Fanfare, Malloy 




For Hawaii, see, e.g., Haw. Rev. Stat. § 706-656(1) (2019) (indicating 
that the sentence for “[p]ersons . . . convicted of first degree murder or first 
degree attempted murder shall be sentenced to life imprisonment without 
possibility of parole,” excluding the death penalty as a punishment) 
2021] MISSING THE MISJOINDER MARK 715 
For Illinois, see, e.g., NPR Staff and Wires, Illinois Abolishes The Death 
Penalty, NPR (Mar. 9, 2011, 1:35 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/2011/03/09/134394946/illinois-abolishes-death-
penalty [https://perma.cc/2ZJ5-3YPT]. 
For Iowa, see, e.g., IOWA CODE § 902.9 (2019) (describing maximum 
sentence for felons as ninety-nine years confinement). 
For Maine, see, e.g., ME. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 1502 (2019). 
For Maryland, see, e.g., Michael Dresser & The Baltimore Sun, 
O’Malley Signs Death Penalty Repeal, BALT. SUN (May 2, 2013, 6:46 PM), 
https://www.baltimoresun.com/politics/bs-md-death-penalty-bill-sign-
20130502-story.html [https://perma.cc/Z5R6-XWWH]. 
For Massachusetts, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 470 
N.E.2d 116 (1984). 
For Michigan, see, e.g., MICH. CONST. art. 4, § 46; MICH. COMP. LAWS 
§ 750.316 (2019). 
For Minnesota, see, e.g., Minn. Stat. §§ 609.10, 609.185 (2019); 1911 
Minn. Laws ch. 387. 
For New Hampshire, see, e.g., Kate Taylor & Richard A. Oppel Jr., New 
Hampshire, With a Death Row of 1, Ends Capital Punishment, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 30, 2019) https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/11/us/death-penalty-
new-hampshire.html [https://perma.cc/4YGE-57NH]. 
For New Jersey, see, e.g., Jeremy W. Peters, Death Penalty Repealed in 
New Jersey, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/
2007/12/17/nyregion/17cnd-jersey.html [https://perma.cc/M5KE-X7NR]. 
For New Mexico, see, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-14-1 (2019). 
For New York, see, e.g., People v. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341, 367 (N.Y. 
2004). 
For North Dakota, see, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-50, repealed by 
N.D. Laws 1973, ch. 116, § 41. 
For Rhode Island, see, e.g., 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-2 (2019). 
For Vermont, see, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 7101 (2019). 
Following Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972), the Vermont 
statute has never been amended to conform to constitutional requirements. 
For Virginia, see, e.g., Hailey Fuchs, Virginia Becomes First Southern 
State to Abolish the Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2021), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/24/us/politics/virginia-death-
penalty.html [https://perma.cc/S4GK-US3A]. 
For Washington, see, e.g., Seattle Times Editorial Board, Legislature, 
Abolish Washington’s Death Penalty, SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 11, 2019, 2:12 
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PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/opinion/editorials/legislature-abolish-
washingtons-death-penalty [https://perma.cc/P86M-24LE]. 
For West Virginia, see, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 61-11-2 (2019). 
For Wisconsin, see, e.g., WIS. STAT. §§ 939.50(3)(a), 940.01 (2019). 
